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Student	 politics	 plays	 a	 formidable	 role	 in	




are	 often	 in	 training	 for	 future	 political	
positions,	 linking	violence	with	politics	 in	a	
self-reinforcing	cycle.	In	addition,	university	




Central	 Student’s	 Union	 (DUCSU)	 –	 often	
called	 Bangladesh’s	 “second	 parliament”.		
These	 factors	 mean	 that	 politics	 and	
academics	 in	 Bangladesh	 is	 combined	 in	 a	
unique	and	complicated	way.		
	
During	 the	 period	 1991-2018,	 students	
played	 a	 part	 in	 over	 25%	 of	 all	 political	
violence,	 and	 as	 high	 as	 50-60%	 in	 certain	
cities	 like	 Rajshahi	 and	 Sylhet.	 Political	
violence	 tends	 to	 flare	up	 at	specific	 times:	
when	 there	 is	 a	 new	 ruling	 party	
consolidating	 its	 power,	 at	 tipping	 points	
when	 students	 feel	 their	 future	
opportunities	 may	 be	 compromised	 by	
changes	in	the	law,	and	most	notably	during	
electoral	 periods.	 Most	 Bangladeshis	
(including	many	student	activists)	admit	that	
this	violence	is	morally	wrong,	and	yet	it	is	so	
entrenched	 that	 it’s	 seen	 as	 inevitable.	
Additionally,	 there	 is	 very	 little	 research	
available	on	the	nature	of	student	politics	or	
the	 various	 factors	 that	 impact	 it.	 The	 few	
studies	that	do	exist	focus	predominantly	on	
Dhaka	 University,	 a	 critical	 epicentre	 of	
student	 politics,	 but	 do	 not	 consider	 the	
differing	 natures	 of	 student	 politics,	 local	
politics,	 and	 political	 violence	 in	 different	
parts	of	the	country.		
	





of	 Dhaka	 University,	 in	 collaboration	 with	
the	Belgium-based	Conflict	Research	Group	
(CRG,	Ghent	University),	with	support	 from	
the	 International	 Foundation	 for	 Electoral	
Systems	 (IFES),	 has	 undertaken	 a	 study	 of	
student	 politics	 and	 political	 violence	 that	
explores	and	compares	the	nature	of	student	
politics	 at	 7	 key	 educational	 cities	 and	 or	




a	 foundation	 for	 further	 research	 and	
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analysis	 in	 this	 complex,	 controversial	 and	
challenging	research	area.		
	
Methodology:	 The	 research	 relies	 on	 both	
face-to-face	 interviews	 in	 selected	 regions,	
as	well	as	a	review	of	the	few	existing	studies	
on	political	 violence	 and	 student	politics	 in	
Bangladesh.	 Research	 focused	 on	 seven	
locations:	 Dhaka,	 Chittagong,	 Rajshahi,	
Sylhet,	Khulna,	Bogra	and	Kushtia.	The	first	
five	 locations	are	main	educational	centers,	
which	 makes	 them	 key	 places	 to	 better	
understand	the	role	of	student	politics.	The	
last	 two	 cases	 offer	 insights	 into	 more	
provincial	 and	 rural	 manifestations	 of	
student	 politics.	 Taken	 together	 the	 cases	
represent	a	diversity	of	settings,	contributing	
and	 expanding	 existing	 knowledge	 about	






universities	 (with	only	a	peripheral	 look	 at	
colleges),	 which	 were	 selected	 from	 the	
largest	 key	 cities	 (future	 studies	of	 tertiary	
cities	would	be	interesting).	In	addition,	the	
study	 relies	 on	 interviews	during	a	 specific	
point-in-time,	 during	 a	 time	 in	 which	 BCL	
student	 wings	 have	 dominated	 on	 campus	




In	 addition,	 the	 study	 considers	 historical	
insights,	 as	 well	 as	 quantitative	 data	 on	
political	 violence	 previously	 conducted	 by	
the	researchers	with	support	from	the	Fund	





student	 politics	 (including	 incentives	 to	
participate);	 the	 type	 and	 intensity	 of	
violence;	 the	 nature	 of	 local,	 district	 or	
national	politics;	familial	and	political	ties	of	
students;	 career	 and	educational	 ambitions	




This	 type	 of	 study	 is	 sensitive	 due	 to	 the	
complicated	 nature	 of	 Bangladeshi	 politics	




could	 provide	 a	 basis	 for	 this	 comparative	
research,	 a	wide	net	was	 cast	 in	 this	 study	
and	 further	 research	 and	 refinement	 is	




Results Analysis & Initial Insights  
	
The	 qualitative	 approach	 of	 this	 study	
resulted	 in	 a	 deeper	 and	 comparative	










the	 ruling	 party	 has	 generally	 been	able	 to	
consolidate	 power	 on	 campuses	 over	 the	





consistent	 under	 previous	 ruling	 party	
administrations.		
	
Student	 dormitories,	 known	 in	 Bangladesh	
as	student	halls,	are	the	main	organizing	unit	
in	 campus	 politics	 (with	 the	 exception	 of	
Chittagong	 University	 where	 this	 tends	 to	
take	place	on	the	shuttle	cars,	or	bogies,	that	
students	 use	 to	 commute	 to	 campus).	 In	
places	 where	 student	 politics	 have	 been	
banned,	 this	 structure	 does	 not	 disappear	
but	rather	moves	to	another	location	–		such	





has	 led	 to	 stronger	 college-level	 student	
politics.	There	is	a	rather	structured	process	
for	moving	up	party	hierarchies	as	students	




to	 encourage	 new	 students	 to	 join,	 and	
disincentives	 for	 non-participation.	
Incoming	 students	 are	 incentivized	 to	 join	
specific	party	wings	through	access	to	scarce	
on-campus	 accommodations	 and	 other	
student	 benefits	which	 are	 denied	 to	 other	
students.	 First	 year	 students	 “earn”	 these	
benefits	 by	 participating	 in	 party-activities	
such	 as	 protests	 in	 which	 they	 are	 often	
required	 to	 initiate	 violence	 and/or	 by	
providing	 security	 to	 more	 senior	 student	
wing	 leaders.	 Incentives	 to	 participate	 in	
student	 politics	 extend	 beyond	 campus	 to	
access	 to	 jobs	 and	 networks	 with,	 or	
controlled	 by,	 influential	 local	 or	 national	
politicians	 (patronage	 and	 shelter).	
Intelligence	 branches	 of	 the	police	 are	 also	
sometimes	 specifically	 tasked	 with	








studies,	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	 new	 students,	





Dhaka	 University	 (DU)	 student	 politics	 are	
particularly	 important	 in	 that	 DU	 students	
hold	 the	 highest	 leadership	 roles	 in	 the	
national	 committees	 for	 each	student	wing,	
and	many	party	leaders	are	(and	historically	
have	 been)	 active	 in	 DU	 student	 wings.	
Student	committees	are	officially	elected,	but	
informally	 selected,	 in	 each	 educational	
institute,	 and	 the	DU	 committee,	 albeit	 not	
according	 to	 the	 official	 rules,	 outranks	
others	 (including	 district,	 city,	 other	
university	 committees).	 The	 hierarchical	
relationship	 between	 committees	 depends	
on	 local	 power	 structure	 and	 leadership	 as	





However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	
nature	 and	 intensity	 of	 student	 political	
violence	 in	 DU	 is	 not	 necessarily	
representative	of	student	violence	across	the	
country	 and	 so	 case	 specific	 analysis	 is	
important.		
	






a	 violent	 incident.	 In	 places	 like	 Dhaka,	
Kushtia	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	Bogra,	 lethal	
casualties	are	a	lower	percentage	than	might	




remains	 the	 single	most	 violent	 location	 in	
Bangladesh	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 political	
violence,	 not	 surprisingly	 given	 its	 large	
population	and	 its	position	as	 the	center	of	
national	 politics.	While	 violent	 incidents	 in	
other	cities	occur	with	less	frequency	than	in	
Dhaka,	 student	 violence	 in	 certain	 other	
cities	 –	 Rajshahi,	 Sylhet,	 Khustia	 –	 is	 often	
more	intense/deadly	than	in	Dhaka.		
	
Khulna	 is	 a	 bit	 of	 an	 outlier	 because	 it	 has	
lower	 levels	 of	 violence	 and	 students	 in	
political	 wings	 prefer	 to	 go	 into	 business	
than	 politics;	 and	 some	 students	 go	 there	
specifically	 to	 avoid	 the	 levels	 of	 student	
politics	and	violence	at	other	schools;	it	may	
be	 that	 having	 alternative	 incentives	 and	
career	 options	 than	politics	 or	 government	
leads	to	less	intense	student	politics	and	less	
violence.	 Student	 politics	 are	 banned	 on	
Khulna	 University	 campus	 (though	 have	
moved	to	colleges).		
	
Just	 as	 violence	 locally	 is	 impacted	 by	 a	
strong	 local	 leader,	 nationally	 violence	 has	
declined	 overall	 in	 the	 2014-2018	 period	
under	 Hasina	 III	 when	 the	 BCL	 has	
consolidated	 power	 on	 campuses,	
marginalizing	 its	 two	 main	 rivals	 the	
Bangladesh	 Nationalist	 Party’s	 Jatiyotabadi	




In	 locations	 with	 strong	 local	 leadership,	
local	mayors	or	party	leaders	appear	to	have	
been	responsible	for	influencing	lower	levels	
of	 student	 political	 violence.	 And	 where	
there	is	a	strong	ICS	presence,	there	appears	
to	be	a	correlation	between	higher	and	more	
lethal	 violence	 with	 BCL	 and	 with	 police,	
possibly	 because	 police	 have	 been	 put	 in	
place	 to	 subdue	 ICS	 presence.	 These	 initial	
insights	 could	 be	 tested	 and	 validated	
against	a	greater	number	of	case	studies.		
	
The	 Nature	 of	 Local,	 District	 or	 National	
Politics:	 DU	 student	 politics	 caters	 most	
closely	 to	 national	 political	 interests	 and	
players,	 while	 others	 have	 strong(er)	 local	
political	 interests.	 Outside	 of	 Dhaka	 the	
loyalties	of	students	can	be	divided	between	
home	districts	and	local	leaders	changing	the	





Especially	 in	 Khulna	 and	 Bogra,	 students	
have	 political	 ties	 outside	 of	 the	 district	
which	 lead	 to	 patronage	 competitions	 and	
suspicion.	In	cases	where	a	large	number	of	
students	 come	 from	 outside	 of	 the	 district,	
student	committees	often	stipulate	 that	 the	
committee	 president	 and	 general	 secretary	
should	 be	 split	 –	 one	 local,	 one	 non-local.	
Though	in	practice	this	is	not	always	the	case	
as	the	stronger	influence	(local	or	non-local)	
will	 often	 jockey	 for	 both	 appointments,	
especially	 since	 these	 tend	 to	 “selection”	
rather	than	election	as	they	should	be	during	
“councils”.	In	Kushtia	–	where	the	university	
is	 on	 the	 border	 between	 two	 districts,	
loyalties	are	often	split	between	Kushtia	and	
Jhenaidah	 political	 allegiances,	 though	





and	 locally	 in	 other	 places	 that	 were	
studied),	 and	 therefore	 political	 leaders	
(nationally	 and	 especially	 locally	 when	 it	
comes	 to	 non-Dhaka	 universities	 and	
colleges)	are	a	notable	factor	in	the	increase	
or	 decrease	 of	 student	 violence.	 Thus	 it	 is	
necessary	to	move	beyond	a	campus-centric	
approach	 to	 understand	 and	 mitigate	
violence.	
	
Familial	 and	 Political	 Connections:	 Family	
connections	are	very	 important	as	students	
who	do	well	in	student	politics	almost	always	
also	 have	 family	 members	 who	 serve	 as	
patrons.	 In	 fact,	 family	 and	 patronage	 ties	
tend	 to	have	 a	 stronger	 impact	 on	political	
advancement	 than	 performance	 in	 student	
political	 wings,	 which	 frustrates	 many	
students	 who	 work	 hard	 within	 these	
structures	but	are	still	overlooked	due	to	lack	
of	 contacts,	 or	 the	 relative	 value	 of	 certain	
districts	 or	 educational	 institutes	 to	 the	
political	center.			
	











regional	 connections	 (most	 pronounced	 at	
Dhaka	 University).	 Hall	 presidents	 and	




Career	 and	 Educational	 Ambitions	 of	
Students:	Employment	opportunities	can	be	
scarce	 in	 Bangladesh	 and	 government	
positions	 and	 tenders	 are	 coveted.	 Since	
these	are	levied	by	the	current	ruling	party,	





studies	 rather	 than	 politics	 may	 choose	 a	
school	 such	 as	 Khulna	 University,	 where	
student	 politics	 is	 banned	 or,	 if	 they	 can	
afford	 it,	 opt	 for	 private	 educational	
institutions.	 Khulna	 is	 also	 a	 business	 hub	
where	 options	 may	 extend	 beyond	
government	and	political	tenders.	Wealthier	
or	 local	 students	who	 can	 afford	 their	 own	
housing,	at	any	university,	also	have	greater	
freedom	to	select	 the	school	of	 their	choice	
without	 being	 forced	 into	 hall	 politics.	
However	this	is	not	always	so	cut	and	dried.	
For	example,	students	in	medical	colleges	(in	
Bogra)	 who	 might	 seem	 to	 have	 non-
government	 career	 options,	 are	 reliant	 on	
medical	 associations	 which	 are	 also	
politicized	 and	 dominated	 by	 the	 current	
ruling	 party.	 Thus	 these	 students	 are	 also	
career-motivated	 to	 join	 BCL	 events	 and	
student	wings.		
	
Intra-Party	 Factionalism:	 Factionalism	 is	
seen	 predominantly	 in	 BCL	and	 JCD.	While	
not	 new,	 infighting,	 and	 especially	 BCL	
factional	violence	is	on	the	rise.	It	appears	to	
be	 spurred	 by	 local	 political	 rivalries	 and	
power	 contests	 between	 influential	 AL	
leaders	either	within	the	same	district/city,	
or	 between	 districts	 (when	 the	 student	
population	 is	 from	 different	 regions).	 In	
recent	 times	 this	 has	 become	 the	 most	
frequent	 student	 violence,	 albeit	 not	 the	
most	lethal.		
	
Intra-party	 fighting	 in	 other	 parties	 has	




in	 Sylhet	 combined	 with	 the	 low	




of	 the	 more	 disciplined	 student	
organizations,	and	is	less	likely	to	engage	in	
intra-organizational	 violence.	 ICS	 has	 a	
stronger	 presence	 outside	 of	 Dhaka	 (and	
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especially	 in	 Kushtia	 Chittagong	 and	
Rajshahi),	 but	 it	 has	 been	 driven	
underground	 in	most	 places.	 Despite	 being	
publicly	marginalized	by	BCL	however,	many	
interviewees	report	it	is	still	well	organized	
and	 remains	 active.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
violence	 with	 ICS	 involvement	 (as	 victims,	





but	 have	 been	 popular	 and	 effective	 in	 the	
few	 cases	when	 they	occur.	The	 election	of	
two	non-BCL	candidates	 for	 the	DU	Central	
Student	Union	(DUCSU)	–	elections	for	which	
are	 mandated	 but	 had	 not	 occurred	 for	
almost	 three	 decades	 –	 is	 interesting	 and	
suggests	there	may	be	more	support	for	non-
party	 affiliated	 student	 representation	 on	
campus	 than	 party	 wings	 would	 like	 to	
admit.	While	BCL	was	able	 to	 influence	 the	
elections	 and	 secure	 all	 but	 2	 seats,	 it	 is	
notable	 that	 the	 highest	 position	 (vice	
president)	went	instead	to	the	leader	of	the	
Quota	Reform	Movement	(protesting	quotas	




included	 1999	 student	 protests	 against	
sexual	 harassment	 by	 student	 party	wings,	
the	 2013	 Shahbag	 movement	 over	 lenient	
sentences	for	war	crimes	for	JeI	leader	Abdul	
Quader	 Mollah,	 and	 the	 2018	 Road	 Safety	
Protests.	 There	 is	 a	 tendency	 of	 party-
affiliated	student	organizations	(particularly	
from	 the	 ruling	 party)	 to	 first	 coopt	 and	 if	
that	 is	 not	 possible,	 to	 repress	 such	
movements.			
	
The	 Role	 of	 Women:	 Women	 participate	 in	
student	politics	to	a	lesser	extent	than	men	
and	tend	to	be	less	violent;	they	are	also	less	
likely	 to	 be	 incentivized	 or	 threatened	 into	
joining	specific	parties	since	the	access	to	a	
place	in	a	female	dormitory	tends	to	be	less	
politicized	 and	 women’s	 participation	 in	
violence	 is	 uncommon.	 Yet,	 in	 several	
locations	 (e.g.,	 Dhaka,	 Chittagong	 and	
Rajshahi)	female	party	members	are	on	the	
rise	 but	 appear	 more	 interested	 in	 issues	
than	 self-interest-based	 politics.	 An	
exception	must	be	made	for	female	student	
leaders	 that	 rose	 the	 party	 ranks	 due	 to	
strong	political	kinship	ties	(e.g.,	father	MP	or	
mayor).	 The	 DUCSU	 election	 at	 Dhaka	




As	 mentioned	 above,	 a	 few	 notable	 non-
partisan	student	protests	in	recent	years	are	
another	 interesting	 phenomenon;	 their	
ability	 to	 influence	 public	 policy	 decisions	
demonstrates	the	power	students	have	even	
independently	 of	 party	 wings	 and	 party	
politics,	as	well	as	the	lack	of	student	politics	
to	 control/co-opt	 all	 student	 movements.	
Yet,	 violence	 remains	 the	 primary	 –	 and	 in	
many	 cases	 the	only	 –	way	 to	 settle	power	
struggles.		
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Possible Approaches for Violence 
Mitigation and Further Study 
	
Based	on	 insights	gleaned	 in	 this	study,	 the	
report	identifies	the	following	possible	areas	
for	 mitigating	 student	 participation	 in	
political	violence:		
	
1. Introduce	 an	 alternative	 incentive	
system.	Providing	an	alternative	to	the	
incentives	 of	 joining	 student	 wings	
(low-cost	 university	 accommodation	




behavior.	 These	 are	 neither	 easy	
solutions,	nor	would	they	necessarily	be	
supported	 by	 parties	 and/or	
government.	 A	 variety	 of	 stakeholders	
would	 need	 to	 be	 engaged	 in	 any	
solution-development	exercise.		
	
2. Work	 with	 student	 bodies,	 such	 as	
DUCSU,	 directly,	 and	 strive	 for	 the	
introduction	 of	 their	 equivalents	 in	
other	 campuses.	While	 this	will	 not	be	
without	 its	 challenges	 –	 especially	
considering	 BCL	 hegemony	 and	 claim	
over	the	DU	campus	and	their	ability	to	
influence	student	body	council	voting	to	
win	 all	 but	 2	 seats	 –	 free	 and	 fair	
elections	 for	 student	 body	
representatives	 on	 a	 non-partisan	
council	could	over	time	strengthen	more	




3. Engage	 interest-based	 student	
movements,	 including	 women,	 in	
student	politics.	 In	some	of	the	places	
studied	 for	 this	 report,	 particularly	 in	
major	 universities	 in	 Dhaka,	 Rajshahi	
and	Chittagong,	 female	participation	 in	
student	 politics	 has	 increased	 quite	
significantly	in	the	past	years.	While	this	
has	 been	 used	 as	 a	 strategy	 by	 BCL	 to	
improve	 the	 image	 of	 the	 student	
organization,	 interviews	 showed	 that	
involvement	 in	 student	 political	
organizations	 has	 resulted	 in	 female	
students	becoming	more	confident	and	
serving	 the	 wider	 student-body.	
Politically	 engaged	 women	 are	 less	
violent	 and	 tend	 to	 be	 more	
independent	 from	 the	 prevailing	 party	
wing	 on	 campus.	 While	 women	 face	 a	
considerable	 amount	 of	 societal	
pressure	 that	 discourages	 them	 from	
joining	 student	 politics,	 creating	 an	
environment	 in	 which	 women	 are	
protected	 and	 encouraged	 to	
participate,	 through	male	 allies	 and	by	
building	the	capacity	and	confidence	of	
female	 students	 to	 join	 politics	




Besides	 women,	 there	 are	 other	
students	 who	 choose	 not	 to	 become	
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engaged	 in	 student	 politics.	 Some	 of	
these	students	engage	just	enough	to	get	
a	place	at	student	halls	and	then	choose	
to	 remain	 in	 ganarooms	 (large	 rooms	
where	upwards	of	40	students	sleep	on	
the	 floor),	or	 if	 their	 financial	situation	
allows	 live	 off	 campus,	 instead	 of	
moving	up	 the	 ranks	 in	political	wings	
through	 violence.	 The	 Road	 Safety	 and	
Quota	 Reform	 movements	 are	 also	
examples	 of	 non-partisan	 student	
mobilization.	AL/BCL	have	had	 trouble	
coopting	 these	 movements	 and	 they	
have	 been	 influential	 enough	 to	
influence	policy.	Looking	in	more	depth	
at	 the	 factors	 which	 allow	 students	 to	





leader	 looks	 like.	 Many	 BCL	 and	 JCD	
student	 leaders	 maintain	 a	 party	
ideology	 that	 is	 largely	 informed	 by	 a	




Adolf	Hitler	 as	 role	models	 is	 common	
amongst	 student	 leaders.	 	 Painting	 a	





one	 path	 to	 power.	 As	 most	





5. Conduct	 further	 research	 at	
universities	 with	 lower	 levels	 of	
violence.	 Some	 universities/colleges	
where	 students	 are	 less	 focused	 on	
political	 careers	 have	 had	 much	 less	
violence	than	others,	such	as	Khulna	and	
medical	 colleges.	 Also	 some	 rural	
universities	 have	 had	 less	 violence.	
These	 schools	 may	 have	 lessons	 for	
others	and/or	may	be	the	best	places	to	
start	 to	 integrate	 non-partisan	 student	




6. Explore	 context	 specific	 strategies.	
The	research	shows	that	while	there	are	
some	 commonalities	 in	 terms	 of	 hall	
politics	 and	 the	 ruling	 party	 student	
wing	 playing	 a	 dominant	 role	 on	
campus,	 the	 nature	 and	 incentives	 for	
student	 political	 violence	 differs	 from	
place	 to	 place.	 This	 means	 that	 the	
solutions	 for	 mitigating	 violence	 may	
also	 be	 location	 specific.	 Given	 the	
connection	 between	 local	 and	 national	
politics	and	student	politics,	 there	may	
also	be	charismatic	 leaders	 in	different	
locations	 who	 could	 be	 champions	 for	
non-violence	 and	 have	 a	 significant	
impact	in	certain	regions.		
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7. Look	 at	 international	 comparative	
examples	when	it	comes	to	recruitment	
behaviour	 and	 cooptation	 of	 student	
groups	 by	 authoritarian	 regimes.	
However,	there	is	a	general	deficit	in	this	
field	of	 literature,	which	 either	 focuses	
on	revolutionary	and	reformist	student	
activism	 that	 is	 directed	 against	 the	
government	and/or	ruling	elites	as	well	
as	 on	 gangs	who	 try	 to	undermine	 the	
government’s	 authority	 over	 the	
monopoly	of	violence.	Studies	that	focus	
on	 (student)	 groups	 recruited	 for	 the	
establishment,	 maintenance	 and	
perseverance	 of	 authoritarian	 regimes	
remains	 largely	 absent.	 Bangladesh	 as	
well	 as	 examples	 from	 regimes	 in	
Nicaragua	or	Russia	may	serve	as	useful	
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Student	 groups	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	
Bangladesh.	 Not	 only	 have	 student	 groups	
often	 been	 at	 the	 vanguard	 of	 crucial	
struggles	 –	 like	 the	 Language	 Movement	
(1947-1952),	 the	 Independence	 movement	
(1969-71)	 and	 the	 pro-democracy	
movement	 (1989-91)	 –	 but	 many	
contemporary	politicians	also	have	roots	 in	
student	organizations.	Student	organizations	
are	 highly	 politicized	 in	 Bangladesh	 and	
operated	 as	 important	 wings	 of	 the	 major	
parties.	 The	 contemporary	 role	 of	 student	
groups	and	student	politics	is	often	seen	in	a	
highly	 negative	 light,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 wider	
degeneration	of	political	values,	exemplified	
by	 a	 perceived	 increase	 in	 violence	 and	
corruption.	While	not	wanting	to	trade	such	
moralistic	 reasoning	 for	 a	 critical	
understanding	 of	 student	 politics	 in	 its	
current	 form,	 it	 is	 undeniable	 that	 student	
politics	 today	 is	 highly	 violent.	Recent	data	




In	 the	 last	 ten	 years	 (2008-2018)	 campus	
violence	 accounted	 for	 13	 per	 cent	 of	
political	 violence	 in	 the	 country.	 If	 all	 off-
campus	 political	 violence	 in	 which	 one	 or	
more	 student	 groups	 participated	 is	








major	 urban	 centers,	 which	 also	 contain	
most	 public	 universities	 and	 colleges.	
Important	to	note	is	that	in	some	urban	areas	




highly	 active	 in	 these	 events.	 As	 a	 result,	
understanding	 student	 politics	 can	 make	
important	 contributions	 to	 understanding	
Bangladesh’s	 political	 system	 and	 political	
violence	 in	 the	 country.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
non-violent	 roles	of	 student	 groups	 remain	
important	 given	 that	 student	 organizations	
remain	 one	 of	 the	 single	 most	 important	
breeding	grounds	for	future	political	leaders.		
Given	 the	 importance	of	student	politicians	
in	 organizing	 and	 participating	 in	 political	
violence,	 as	 well	 as	 student	 politics’	
formative	 role	 in	 the	 making	 of	 party	
politicians,	it	is	surprising	that	we	still	have	





number	 of	 interesting	 studies	 have	 been	
written	 on	 student	 politics1,	 they	 share	 a	
major	 shortcoming	 in	 that	 all	 are	 based	
solely	 on	 research	 in	 Dhaka	 and	
predominantly	 within	 Dhaka	 University	
(DU).	 Given	 that	 this	 university	 plays	 a	
particular	 role	 in	 Bangladesh	 history	 (see	
section	 2),	 as	 well	 as	 dominates	 student	
politics	 in	 general	 (for	 instance	 by	 almost	
always	 supplying	 both	 the	 president	 and	
general	secretary	of	the	central	committees	
of	 student	organizations),	 a	 key	hypothesis	
of	the	research	project	was	that	generalizing	
from	 the	 Dhaka	 case	 is	 not	 without	
difficulties.		
This	research	project	thus	aimed	to	build	on	
the	 work	 already	 done,	 but	 to	 radically	
expand	 our	 comparative	 understanding	 of	
student	politics	by	looking	beyond	Dhaka.	
	
Our	 research	 focused	 on	 five	 major	 cities	
which	 are	 also	 major	 centers	 of	 higher	
education	 –	 Dhaka,	 Chittagong,	 Khulna,	
Rajshahi,	 and	 Sylhet,	 the	 important	 district	
headquarters	 of	 Bogra	 and	 one	 rural	
university	 (the	 Islamic	 University	 in	
Kushtia).	Interviews	were	conducted	–	with	
both	 ruling	 party	 and	 opposition	 student	
activists,	general	students	and	university	or	
college	staff	–	to	gain	insights	in	the	profile	of	
                                               
1	Andersen,	M.K.	(2016)	‘Time-Use,	Activism	and	the	Making	of	Future’,	South	Asia:	Journal	of	South	Asian	Studies,	Vol.	
39	 (2),	pp.	415-429.	Andersen,	M.K.	 (2013)	The	politics	 of	 politics:	 Youth	mobilization,	aspirations	and	 the	 threat	of	




student	 politicians,	 the	 organization	 of	
student	politics	in	the	specific	locations,	the	
relations	 between	 city	 politics	 and	 student	








university	 and	 college	 campuses	 but	 also	










We	 find	 that	 the	Dhaka	scenario	of	student	
politics,	 although	 often	 perceived	 as	 a	




operation	 of	 student	 politics	 is	 to	 some	
extent	 integrated	 in	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
party-state.	As	argued	by	Bert	Suykens2,	 ‘in	
party	 states	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	
party	 and	 the	 government	 becomes	
confused’.	 More	 crucial	 however	 for	 our	
discussion	here	is	that	party	wings—in	this	
cases	 student	 organizations—become	
crucial	 actors	 in	 controlling	 particular	
sectors	or	polities	for	the	party	in	power.	In	
Bangladesh,	 ruling	 party	 students	 are	 key	
actors	 in	 controlling	 campuses,	 but	 also	 in	
maintaining	 party-state	 control	 more	 in	
general	 by	 supplying	 party-political	
manpower.	Dhaka	University	is	a	key	case,	as	




This	 picture	 however	 becomes	much	more	
complicated	 once	we	 leave	 Dhaka.	 In	most	
other	 cases,	 the	 interaction	 between	
national,	 regional	 and	 local	 political	 party	
                                               
2 Suykens,	 B.	 (2017)	 ‘The	 Bangladesh	 party-state:	 a	 diachronic	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 party-political	
regimes’,	Commonwealth	&	Comparative	Politics,	Vol.	55	(2),	pp.	187-213.	
forces	have	been	shaping	student	politics	to	
a	 large	 degree.	 While	 in	 Dhaka,	 national	
politics	is	able	to	have	a	firm	grip	on	student	
politics	 and	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 between	
different	political	student	organizations,	this	
is	 much	 less	 the	 case	 outside	 the	 capital.	
While	almost	always	the	 impact	of	national	
politics	 can	 be	 felt,	 the	 presence	 of	 local	
political	 leaders—and	 certainly	 as	 they	 are	
of	 the	 national	 opposition—have	 a	 key	
impact	both	on	 the	organization	of	 student	
politics	 and	 on	 student	 violence.	 The	
presence	of	strong	unitary	leadership	at	the	
local	 level	 (mostly	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	Mayor)	
can	 reduce	 the	 levels	 of	 factional	 violence	
significantly,	 while	 local	 party-political	
factionalism	is	directly	reflected	in	student-
political	 factionalism.	Given	 the	 importance	
of	 factional	 violence	 in	 overall	 levels	 of	
student	 violence	 this	 is	 highly	 significant,	
and	 often	 independent	 from	 national	 level	
political	processes.	
	
The	 most	 important	 example	 of	 the	
complication	 of	 party-state	 control	 is	
probably	 the	 influence	 of	 Islami	 Chhatra	
Shibir	 (ICS),	 the	 student	 wing	 of	 Jamaat-e-
Islami,	in	many	of	the	campuses.	While	often	
they	 were	 under	 more	 pressure	 during	
Awami	League	(AL)	rule	at	the	center,	 they	
were	 able	 to	have	a	 clear-cut	presence	and	
sometimes	 control	 over	many	 campuses	 in	





more	 autocratic	 party-state,	 that	 ICS	 has	
been	dislodged	from	all	studied	campuses.	
	
To	 summarize:	 exactly	 because	 of	 its	
national	 appeal,	 DU	 does	 not	 allow	 us	 to	
understand	well	 the	 integration	 of	 student	




need	 to	 understand	 local	 party-political	
connections	 if	 we	want	 to	 address	 student	
political	violence	beyond	Dhaka.	
	
For	 policy	 makers	 and	 development	
practitioners	 that	means	 a	 need	 to	 rethink	




1.1.1 Case selection 
As	mentioned,	research	has	focused	on	seven	
locations	 (Dhaka,	 Chittagong,	 Rajshahi,	
Sylhet,	Khulna,	Bogra	and	Kushtia;	see	figure	
1).	 The	 first	 five	 locations	 are	 main	
educational	 centers,	 with	 not	 only	 one	 or	
more	 public	 universities	 (see	 also	 table	 2),	
but	also	colleges	and	private	 institutions	of	
higher	 education.	 This	 makes	 them	 key	
places	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 role	 of	




Student	Politics:	 Performativity	 and	 the	Digital	 Public	 Space	 in	 Bangladesh’,	The	 Journal	 of	 Asian	 Studies,	pp.	 1-32.	
doi:10.1017/S0021911819001839.	
student	 politics.	 The	 last	 two	 cases	 offer	
insights	 into	 more	 provincial	 and	 rural	
manifestations	 of	 student	 politics.	 Taken	




All	 cases	 also	 see	 high	 levels	 of	 political	





Dhaka,	 and	 DU	 in	 particular,	 is	 the	 central	
hub	of	student	politics.	DU	was	a	key	location	
in	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 not	 only	
student	politics,	but	the	country	as	a	whole,	
with	 DU	 students	 taking	 the	 lead	 in	 many	
historical	resistance	movements	(see	section	
2).	 It	 also	 forms	 a	 blueprint	 for	 the	
organization	of	student	politics	(see	section	
4.1).	 DU,	 however,	 caters	more	 to	 national	
than	local	party	politics	as	compared	to	the	
other	cases.	Interestingly,	it	is	no	longer	the	




The	port	 city	Chittagong,	 the	major	 trading	
hub	in	Bangladesh,	is	considered	the	second	




many	 colleges	 and	 universities,	 it	 is	 also	 a	
major	 center	 of	 education.	 One	 of	 the	
interesting	 features	of	 the	city	 is	that	while	
many	 colleges	 are	 located	 in	 town,	
Chittagong	 University,	 student-wise	 the	
third	 largest	 in	 the	 country,	 is	 based	 in	
Hathazari	 Upazila,	 outside	 the	 territorial	
vicinity	 of	 Chittagong	 city.	 This	 has	 had	 an	




high	 levels	 of	 student	 violence	 (each	 being	
the	location	of	more	than	50%	of	all	violence	
in	 their	 respective	 districts).	 But	 they	 are	
very	different	in	their	political	setup.	While	
Rajshahi	is	overall	more	violent,	city	politics	
shows	 relatively	 less	 signs	 of	 factionalism.	





Sylhet	 is	 marked	 by	 its	 transnational	
connections	 to	 London	 and	 a	 relatively	




Khulna,	 of	 all	 the	 research	 locations,	 is	 the	
least	violent.	The	ban	on	student	politics	at	
Khulna	university	 (when	 it	was	 founded	by	
                                               
4	Mirza	Fakrul	Islam	Alamgir,	the	BNP	secretary	general,	was	elected	as	MP	for	Bogra	town	(Bogra-6	constituency)	in	
the	2018	general	elections,	showing	the	symbolic	importance	of	the	Bogra	town	for	BNP.	Traditionally	Khaleda	Zia	was	
elected	from	this	constituency	but	she	was	 in	 jail	at	 the	time	of	elections	(and	still	at	 the	time	of	writing).	Alamgir	




a	 good	 case	 to	 understand	 the	 conditions	





Bogra	 and	 Kushtia	 were	 selected	 not	 only	
because	 they	 see	 relatively	 high	 levels	 of	
violence,	 but	 because	 of	 their	 role	 in	
opposition	 politics.	 Bogra	 town	 is	 a	
traditional	 stronghold	 of	 Bangladesh	
Nationalist	Party	(BNP)4.	The	Bogra	6	(Bogra	
town)	 constituency	 is	 home	 to	 BNP	
chairperson	 and	 former	 Prime	 Minister	
Khaleda	Zia,	while	her	husband	and	founder	
of	BNP,	Ziaur	Rahman,	was	born	in	the	Bogra	
7	 constituency.	 Kushtia	 and	 the	 Islamic	
University	 experienced	 large-scale	 violence	
during	the	2013	War	Crimes	Tribunals.	The	





1.1.2 Research design 
The	 research	 results	 presented	 here	 are	 in	
one	case	(Rajshahi)	based	on	the	long-term	
fieldwork	 of	 Julian	 Kuttig	 (one	 of	 the	
authors).	 In	the	other	 locations	a	 team	of	6	




them	 local	 to	 the	 study	 sites),	 5	 local	
supervisors	 and	 one	 international	 expert	
(Julian	 Kuttig)	 conducted	 interviews	 with	
student	activists	and	leaders	(both	from	the	
ruling	party	and	the	opposition),	university	
(professorial/faculty)	 staff	 and	 general	
students.	 Given	 time	 concerns,	most	 of	 our	
research	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 main	 public	
university	in	each	research	location,	with	the	




period,	 both	 university	 and	 non-university	
student	politics	was	researched.		
	
Fieldwork	was	 conducted	 for	 4-5	weeks	 in	
each	 location.	 Researchers	 worked	 with	 a	
standardized,	 yet	 semi-structured	 research	
checklist.	 This	 enabled	 comparison	 among	
cases,	 but	 also	 a	 focus	 on	 locality-specific	
dynamics.	Researchers	were	given	a	training,	
on	 the	 research	 topic	 and	methodology,	 as	
well	 as	 on	 ethical	 considerations	 when	
researching	sensitive	subject	matter.	
Besides	 fieldwork	 this	 report	 also	presents	
quantitative	 data	 on	 student	 politics.	 This	
data	 is	 based	 on	 a	 dataset	 on	 political	




at	 least	 one	 injured/	
death/raped/abducted/held	 hostage	 or	 in	
property	 destruction	 and	 2)	 explicitly	
political:	 involving	members	of	at	 least	one	
clearly	 delineated	 political	 group:	 political	
party	and	all	its	allied	organizations,	Islamist	
organization,	 or	 rebel	 group6.	 This	 is	 a	
minimal	 definition.	 Given	 the	 fact	 that	 not	
every	event	of	political	violence	is	recorded	




Data	 presented	 here	 is	 organized	 around	
three	main	 elements:	 events,	wounded	and	
lethal	 casualties.	 Events	 refer	 to	 single	
instances	 of	 political	 violence	 in	 our	
database.		
 	




















Dhaka	University		 33360	 2268	 1043	 3040	
Rajshahi	University		 37256	 1202	 735	 1896	
Chittagong	University	 28216	 1303	 386	 1960	
Islamic		University	Kushtia			 13636	 351	 410	 502	
SUST,	Sylhet	 10113	 500	 236	 497	
Khulna	University	 7269	 410	 254	 484	
	
	
In	 many	 cases	 we	 have	 used	 multiple	
response	sets	as	more	than	one	actor	is	often	
involved	 in	 one	 event.	 Our	 data	 on	 the	
particular	 student	 groups	 should	 thus	 be	
read	with	care.	Events	data	show	the	number	
of	 events	 a	 group	 participated	 in.	 The	
number	 or	 percentages	 of	 wounded	 and	
lethal	casualties	similarly	show	the	number	
or	 percentages	 of	 wounded	 and	 lethal	
casualties	 arising	 from	 events	 in	 which	 a	
particular	 group	 participated.	 It	 does	 not	
mean	 to	 state	 that	 e.g.	 they	 were	 either	
responsible	for	killing	that	number	of	people,	
or	that	so	many	of	their	number	were	killed	
in	 these	 events.	 It	 rather	 reflects	 the	
intensity	of	violence.	
	
Data	 on	 factional	 violence	 focuses	 on	
violence	between	student	groups	and	other	
organisations	 within	 the	 same	 political	
family.	 So	 factional	 violence	 is	 both	
understood	 as	 violence	 within	 a	 particular	
student	 group,	 and	 as	 violence	 between	
members	of	the	student	group	and	members	





It	must	 be	 stated	 here	 that	 the	 research	 is	
politically	 highly	 sensitive.	 Student	
organizations	 are	 a	 key	 wing	 for	 political	
parties	 and	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	
organization	 of	 party-states	 in	 Bangladesh.	
Particularly	 at	 this	 stage,	 with	 the	 Awami	
League	(AL)	in	their	third	consecutive	term,	
and	 its	 democratic	 legitimacy	 being	




We	 want	 to	 stress	 that	 the	 dynamics	 in	
student	 politics	 cannot	 be	 allocated	 to	 one	
specific	party	but	are	part	of	larger	historical	
legacies	 and	political	 trajectories	of	 nation-
state	formation.	This	report	is	not	a	critique	
of	 any	one	party	but	a	 general	 overview	of	
the	 functioning	 of	 student	 politics	 in	
contemporary	 Bangladesh.	 The	 behavior	 of	









points	 in	 time.	While	 AL	 is	 dominant	 now,	
previously	it	was	e.g.	BNP-Jamaat-e-Islami—




1.1.3 Limitations of the study 
For	the	field-work	bases	study,	it	is	clear	that	
time	 constraints	 impact	 on	 the	 study.	 The	
relatively	 short	 fieldwork	 time	 in	 most	
locations	can	of	course	not	compare	to	the	in-
depth	 ethnographic	 work	 in	 Rajshahi.	 This	
also	made	it	necessary	to	focus	the	research	
in	most	cases	on	the	main	public	university.	
It	 would	 of	 course	 be	 interesting	 to	
supplement	this	research	with	more	work	on	
colleges	 or	 even	 schools,	 where	 student	
political	recruitment	sometimes	starts.		
	
Also,	 while	 the	 selection	 of	 research	
locations	 was	 done	 consistently,	 more	
research	 on	 more	 rural	 or	 small-town	




and	 while	 a	 clear	 effort	 has	 been	 made	 to	
interview	 respondents	 across	 the	 party-
political	 spectrum,	 our	 sample	 is	 skewed	
towards	 BCL.	 As	 the	 other	 student	
organizations	 simply	 have	 become	 less	
active	in	and	around	campuses,	and	in	some	
cases	 have	 moved	 to	 some	 extent	
underground,	 contacting	 them	 for	
interviews	 has	 been	 challenging.	While	 we	
succeeded	 to	 do	 this,	 a	 larger	 sample	 of	
opposition	 student	 activists	 would	 have	




The	 quantitative	 data	 have	 three	 main	
limitations,	of	which	the	first	two	are	closely	
related.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 limited	 amount	 of	
newspapers	that	can	be	used	in	this	type	of	
study.	Given	the	relatively	limited	overlap	in	
the	 reporting	 of	 events	 between	 different	
newspapers,	 adding	 newspaper	 sources	
would	probably	also	add	new	violent	events	
to	 the	dataset.	The	data	presented	are	 thus	
conservative	 estimates.	 Secondly,	 the	
newspapers	 used	 are	 all	 national	
newspapers	 and	 the	 inclusion	 of	 regional	
newspapers	 would	 again	 increase	 the	




the	 local	 pressure	 on	 journalists	 has	 been	
increasing,	certainly,	but	not	only,	in	the	last	
couple	of	years.	This	makes	newspaper	data	
at	 the	 same	 time	 key	 to	 build	 extensive	
datasets	 on	 violent	 events,	 but	 also	 a	






The	 rest	 of	 the	 report	will	 be	 organized	 as	
follows.	 First,	 we	 will	 introduce	 student	
politics,	 by	 showing	 its	 central	 role	 in	 the	
political	 development	 of	 Bangladesh,	
Secondly,	 we	 will	 provide	 a	 quantitative	
overview	 of	 the	 prevalence	 of	 student	
violence.	 Thirdly,	 we	 will	 provide	 an	
overview	 of	 the	 main	 research	 results,	
providing	 general	 insights	 into	 the	
organization	of	student	politics	and	violence,	
and	 giving	 details	 about	 case-specific	
findings.	We	will	 conclude	 by	 summing	 up	
the	 main	 research	 results	 and	 providing	
possible	 approaches	 to	 further	 the	





















Bangladeshi	 nation,	 its	 movement	 for	 and	
war	 of	 independence,	 as	 well	 as	 pro-
democracy	struggles.	The	pre-1991	period	is	
often	 equated	 with	 a	 heroic	 battle	 for	
political	 freedom,	 while	 post-1991	 student	
politics	 was	 considered	 to	 be,	 at	 best,	
coopted	 by	 political	 party	 regimes	 or,	 at	




the	 (historical)	 importance	 of	 student	
politics,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 try	 to	
demonstrate	 that	 this	 distinction	 between	
pre	 and	 post-1991	 politics	 is	 not	 clear-cut	
and	 show	 how	 student	 politicians,	 also	
before	 1991	 were	 prone	 to	 (factional)	
infighting	and	violence,	as	well	as	have	been	
coopted	 by	 the	 movements	 they	 are	 often	
said	to	have	simply	combatted.		
	
















in	 what	 is	 now	 Bangladesh,	 spoke	 Urdu,	
which	 quickly	 led	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	
protests.	 Students	 would	 become	
immediately	 affected	 as	 Urdu	 became	 the	
sole	medium	 of	 higher	 education.	 	 Student	
leaders	like	Mohammad	Toaha,	Abdul	Matin,	
but	 also	 future	 father	 of	 the	 nation	 Sheikh	
Mujibur	 Rahman	 would	 take	 the	 lead	 in	
organizing	 processions	 and	 blockades	 to	
protest	 Pakistan’s	 Prime	 Ministers’	








leadership	 to	 take	 students’	 concerns	
seriously	 had	 already	 led	 to	 an	 erosion	 of	
Muslim	 League	 support.	 An	 anti-Muslim	
League	 fraction	 left	 the	 All	 India	 Bengal	
Muslim	 Students	 League	 (founded	 in	 1937	
by	 Jinnah	 himself)	 and	 formed	 the	 East	
Pakistan	 Muslim	 Students	 League	 (the	
predecessor	of	 the	present-day	Bangladesh	
Chhatra	 League)	 in	 January	 1948,	 with	





particular	 importance	 was	 the	 mass	
demonstration	 on	 21	 February	 1952	 in	
which	police	killed	a	number	of	student	and	
youth	 demonstrators.	 This	 date	 is	 still	
celebrated	 as	 Language	Martyrs’	 Day,	 with	
martyrs’	memorials	(Shaheed	Minars)	set	up	
near	 or	 on	 University	 campuses	 to	
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Many	 students,	 including	 Toaha	 were	
arrested	and	remained	in	jail	until	the	1954	
Provincial	 Assembly	 elections	 in	which	 the	
Muslim	League	was	 all	 but	wiped	 out	 by	 a	
student-supported	 joint	 front.	 In	 the	 end,	
Bengali	 would	 be	 adopted	 as	 a	 national	
language	in	1956.	
	
The	 Language	 Movement	 positioned	
students	 and	 student	 politicians	 as	 key	
actors	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 national	 culture	





of	 the	key	 student	 leaders	of	 those	 times	 –		
including	 Sheikh	 Mujibur	 Rahman	 (one	 of	
the	 principal	 organizers	 of	 East	 Pakistan	
Muslim	 Students	 League	 in	 1948),	 Syed	
Nazrul	 Islam	 (President	 of	 Salimullah	




national	 liberation	 struggle	 of	 Bangladesh,	




During	 the	 Language	 Movement	 the	 links	
between	student	organizations	and	political	
parties	 were	 cemented.	 The	 Bangladesh	





Pakistan	 Student’s	 Union	 (Chhatra	 Union),	
founded	in	1952,	became	the	student	wing	of	
the	Leftist	Parties	and	most	importantly	the	
National	 Awami	 Party	 (NAP)	 after	 it	 was	
founded	1957.		
	
While	 students	 continued	 to	 launch	




Chancelor	 Mahmood	 Hossain	 and	 installed	
the	regime	backed	M.O.	Ghani.	While	earlier	
Vice	 Chancellors	 operated	 fairly	
independently,	 the	 insertion	 of	 what	
amounted	to	a	regime	stooge,	would	form	a	
precedent	 in	 independent	 Bangladesh,	 of	
Vice	Chancellors	protecting	 the	 interests	 of	
the	 ruling	 government,	 rather	 than	 that	 of	
the	university.	In	a	similar	vein,	the	Pakistan	
military	 regime,	 tried	 to	 counter	 (largely	
unsuccessfully)	 the	anti-Pakistan	sentiment	
among	 the	 East-Pakistan	 student	 body	 by	
fielding	 a	 government	 sponsored	 student	
organization	 of	 its	 own:	 The	 National	
Students	 Federation	 (NSF).	 This	would	 not	
only	 lead	 to	 substantial	 violence	 between	
rival	political	groups,	it	would	also	provide	a	
template	 followed	by	 future	military	 rulers	
Ziaur	Rahman	and	H.	M.	Ershad	in	post-1971	








While	party	politicians	 took	 the	 lead	 in	 the	
Liberation	 War,	 students	 would	 play	 a	
crucial	 role	 in	providing	muscle	power	and	
ideological	 leadership	 in	 the	 struggle.	
Students	 would	 not	 only	 stress	
independence,	 but	 also	 socialist	 reforms.	
During	a	public	rally	on	3	March	1971	they	
proclaimed	 independence	 and	 declared	
Sheikh	 Mujibur	 Rahman	 “Father	 of	 the	
Nation”	and	Bangabandhu	“friend	of	Bengal”.	
Students	 were	 also	 the	 first	 to	 design	 and	
raise	 the	 flag	 of	 independent	 Bangladesh.	
Moreover,	 when	 the	 Pakistan	 government	
launched	 Operation	 Search	 Light	 on	 12	
March	 1971,	 violently	 suppressing	 the	
independence	 movement,	 DU	 was	
specifically	 targeted.	 	 A	 large	 number	 of	
students	and	teaching	staff	were	killed.		
	
While	 members	 of	 the	 Jamaat-e-Islami’s	
student	wing	Islami	Chhatra	Sangha	–	today	
known	 as	 Islami	 Chhatra	 Shibir	 (ICS)	 –			
formed	 the	 Al-Badr	 militia	 which	
collaborated	with	the	Pakistani	forces,	other	
students	 and	 student	 organizations	 joined	
Mukti	Bahini	–	freedom	fighter	–	outfits	led	
by	 Bengali	 military,	 paramilitary,	 and	
civilians.	 These	 groups	 formed	 the	 guerilla	
army	 that	would	 fight	 against	 the	 Pakistan	
military	 forces	 deployed	 to	 East	 Pakistan.	





surface	 as	 student	 joined	 different	 guerilla	
outfits.	
	
Under	 the	 leadership	 of	 Sheikh	 Fazlul	 Huq	
Moni	(the	nephew	of	Mujib)	and	Sirajul	Islam	
Khan,	many	 BCL	activists	 joined	 the	 ‘Mujib	
Bahini’,	 one	 of	 many	 Mukti	 Bahini	 outfits,	
which	was	directly	loyal	to	Mujib.	Meanwhile	
leftist	students	associated	with	the	Student’s	
Union,	 the	 National	 Awami	 Party,	 and	 the	
Communist	 Party	 formed	 the	 ‘combined	
guerilla	 force’	 under	 commander	
Mohammad	Farhad,	a	former	Chhatra	Union	
leader	 and	 organizer	 of	 the	 Central	
Committee	 of	 the	 underground	 Communist	
Party.		
	
After	 independence	 in	December	1971,	 the	
Mujib	 government	 tried	 to	 disarm	 the	
student	 forces,	 but	 largely	 failed	 to	 do	 so.		
Instead,	 the	 united	 student	 front	 broke	 up	
into	 factions	 as	 one	 of	 its	main	 goals	 since	
1947	 had	 been	 reached.	 The	 revolutionary	
socialist	wing	of	the	BCL	would	be	crucial	in	
forming	 the	 Jatiya	 Samajtrantrik	 Dal	 (JSD),	
one	 of	 the	 main	 party-political	 rivals	 of	
Awami	 League	 in	 the	 early	 years	 after	
independence.	And	the	Chhatra	Union,	which	
was	 associated	 with	 the	 National	 Awami	
Party,	became	very	prominent	after	winning	
the	1972	DU	Central	Student	Union	elections	
(DUCSU).	 DUCSU,	 also	 dubbed	 the	 second	
parliament	 of	 Bangladesh,	 represents	 DU	
students	in	the	University's	decision-making.	
Certainly,	 in	 the	 pre-1991	 period	 its	
elections	 offered	 good	 insights	 in	 the	
political	 mood	 on	 campus.	 Increasingly,	
however,	 Awami	 League	 and	 BCL	 student	
politics	 were	 not	 radical	 enough	 for	 many	




clashes	 between	 members	 of	 rival	 student	
groups.	 The	 historical	 record	 is	 still	 not	
settled	 on	 whether	 the	 failed	 post-war	
campaign	 by	 the	 government	 to	 disarm	
former	freedom	fighters	led	Chhatra	Union-	
and	JSD-affiliated	students	to	start	an	armed	
campaign,	 or	 whether	 it	 was	 Mujib	 who	
allowed	the	AL	wing	of	the	BCL	to	be	armed	
to	 expand	 their	 dominance	 on	 campuses	
across	the	country	and	DU	more	specifically.	
In	 any	 case	 the	 politicization	 of	 student	
groups	along	party	lines	can	be	traced	to	this	
period,	when	the	student	front,	which	fought	
first	 for	 the	 mother	 tongue	 and	 later	






Rahman	 emerged	 as	 the	 new	 leader.	 He	
started	 to	 reshuffle	 not	 only	 the	 party-
political,	 but	 also	 the	 student-political	
balance	 of	 power.	 	 Not	 only	 did	 he	 clamp	
down	on	JSD	student	activists	and	other	left-
wing	student	groups,	he	also	fielded	his	own	
student	 group,	 the	 Bangladesh	 Jatiyotabadi	
Chhatra	 Dal	 (JCD),	 in	 1979	 as	 part	 of	 the	





to	 counter	 strong	 resistance	 from	
established	 (left-wing)	 student	 groups	 but	
got	full	support	of	the	regime.	This	installed	
the	 tradition	 of	 armed	 control	 over	
campuses	 by	 the	 ruling	 party’s	 student	
group.	 However,	 as	 the	 DUCSU	 election	




The	 Ziaur	 Rahman	 regime	 also	 saw	 the	
resurgence	of	Islamist	student	groups,	which	
had	 been	 banned	 under	 Mujibur	 Rahman.	
ICS	quickly	emerged	as	the	student	group	of	







Zia	 was	 killed	 in	 a	 coup	 and	 General	 H.M.	
Ershad	came	to	power.	Ershad	followed	Zia’s	
example	and	fielded	a	student	group	–	Notun	
Bangla	 Chhatra	 Samaj;	 later	 Jatiyo	 Chhatra	
Samaj	 –	 quickly	 after	 he	 declared	 himself	
Chief	 Martial	 Law	 Administrator.	 Chhatra	
Samaj,	however,	was	never	able	to	establish	
itself	despite	full	state	support—which	led	to	
a	 proliferation	 of	 arms	 and	 money	 on	 the	
campus—and	 Ershad’s	 recruitment	 of	
DUCSU	 General	 Secretary	 Ziauddin	 Ahmed	
Bablu.		
	
Ershad	 would	 be	 somewhat	 successful	 in	
pursuing	 a	 divide	 and	 rule	 strategy,	 which	
led	to	clashes	between	BCL	and	JCD,	and	also	
to	factional	infighting.	However,	overall	this	
period	 can	 be	 characterized	 as	 one	 big	
struggle	 against	 Ershad,	 with	 student	
organizations	often	acting	as	a	front	for	their	
respective	political	parties,	whose	activities	
had	 been	 banned	 by	 Ershad.	 They	 were	
engaged	in	(banned)	processions,	organized	
hartals	 (general	 strikes)	 and	 sit-ins	 at	 the	
university	and	at	government	buildings.	As	a	
result,	many	student	activists	were	killed	in	
government	 crackdowns	 throughout	 the	
1980s.	
	




alliance	 won,	 and	 in	 1990	 JCD	won.	 These	




The	 student	 opposition	 to	 Ershad	 and	 the	
resulting	crackdown,	as	well	as	student	and	
teacher	 strikes,	 made	 universities,	 DU	 in	
particular,	 close	 and	 suspend	 classes	
repeatedly	throughout	the	1980s.	This	came	












After	 the	 installation	 of	 democracy	 in	




not	 without	 grounds.	 In	 earlier	 periods	
students	had	also	been	 co-opted	by	parties	
and	 regimes	 to	 foster	 their	 agenda	 on	
campuses,	 but	 students	 associated	 with	
different	 political	 parties	 joined	 hands	 at	
times	to	accomplish	a	common	objective,	e.g.	
to	 oust	 Ershad.	 However,	 since	 1991	 there	
have	 been	 only	 limited	 instances	 of	 inter-
party	 cooperation.	 	 Factional	 struggles	
within	the	student	organizations	have	often	
been	 settled	 by	 violence.	 More	 than	 ever,	
political	party	patronage	(often	embodied	by	
a	 specific	 local	 leader,	 MP	 or	 Minister)	 is	




have	 been	 central	 in	 controlling	 campuses,	
not	only	by	occupying	student	halls	but	also	
by	 trying	 to	 keep	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	









of	 general	 students,	 activist	 or	 policy-
oriented	 movements	 with	 the	 support	 of	
general	 students	have	 continued	 to	 surface	
in	 the	 post	 1991	 period.	 Sometimes	 these	
movements	were	in	direct	opposition	to	the	
control	 of	 campuses	 by	 incumbent	 party	
student	 groups.	 In	 1999	 e.g.	 there	 were	
large-scale	 protests	 against	 sexual	
harassment	by	BCL	activists	which	started	at	
Jahangirnagar	 University,	 just	 outside	
Dhaka.	 The	 same	 year	 saw	 large	 anti-BCL	
protests	 at	 the	 Bangladesh	 University	 of	
Technology	and	Engineering	(BUET)	where	
a	 female	student	was	killed	 in	 the	crossfire	
between	rival	BCL	groups.		
	
Recent	 years	 saw	a	 clear-cut	 resurgence	of	
this	more	 activist	 oriented	 form	 of	 student	
movements.	These	 however	do	not	 replace	
the	 party-based	 student	 politics,	 but	 often	
has	a	rather	uneasy	relation	to	it.	Movements	
which	are	generated	outside	of	party	politics	
are	 often	 viewed	 with	 suspicion	 and	 the	


















Even	 more	 recently,	 the	 Quota	 Reform	
Movement	of	 2018	protested	 the	quotas	 in	
government	 services	 (e.g.,	 for	 freedom	
fighters	and	their	children).	This	movement	
was	key	for	university	students	as	many	vie	
for	 coveted	 government	 jobs	 after	
graduating.	 	 Processions	 were	 undertaken	
throughout	 Bangladesh’s	 university	 cities.	
While	 the	 movement	 initially	 enjoyed	
widespread	 support	 amongst	 AL-affiliated	
BCL	 leaders,	AL	was	not	 able	 to	 co-opt	 the	
movement.	Fearing	the	movement	would	be	
used	by	the	opposition	to	challenge	AL	rule,	
the	 party	 eventually	 used	 BCL	 cadres	 to	
attack	 the	 processions	 in	 an	 effort	 to	
violently	suppress	the	movement.	`	
	
Prime	 Minister	 Sheikh	 Hasina	 as	 well	
initially	 seemed	 to	 heed	 the	 call	 of	 the	
movement	 by	 proclaiming	 to	 abolish	 all	
quota	 in	 March	 2018,	 which	 is	 a	 good	
indicator	 for	 how	 seriously	 student	











post,	 of	 DUCSU.	 The	 March	 2019	 DUCSU	
elections	 were	 important	 in	 itself	 as	 they	
were	 the	 first	 to	 be	 held	 since	 the	 1990	
elections.		
	
It	 remains	 to	be	seen	how	AL	will	 confront	
these	 policy-based	 student	 movements	 in	
the	 future.	 The	 Shahbag	 movement	 was	
fairly	 easily	 coopted,	 given	 joint	 interests	
between	 the	 protesters	 and	 AL.	 The	 Quota	
Reform	 Movement	 and	 the	 Road	 Safety	
Protest	 saw	 at	 the	 same	 time	 harsh	
repression—often	 meted	 out	 by	 BCL	
cadres—and	 (backtracked)	 statements	 of	
Sheikh	Hasina	which	seemed	to	show	at	least	
a	willingness	 to	respond	to	 the	demands	of	
the	 protesters.	 For	 some	 BCL	 respondents,	
the	 election	 of	 Nurul	 Haq	 Nur	 for	 DUCSU,	
showed	the	openness	of	AL	and	BCL	to	work	
together	 with	 their	 critics.	 Given	 the	
historical	participation	of	students	in	policy	
and	 resistance	 movements,	 the	 AL	
leadership	will	 have	 to	device	 strategies	 to	
work	together	or	defuse	student	movements,	
if	 it	 wants	 to	 continue	 in	 power.	 Thereby	

















Before	 turning	 to	 the	 results	 of	 the	
qualitative	 research,	 we	 want	 to	
contextualize	our	 findings	by	providing	 the	




organizations	 involved	 (table	 3),	 BCL	 was	
most	 involved	 in	 violence	 (17,9	 per	 cent).	
JCD	register	a	much	lower	share	at	just	over	
10	per	cent.	ICS	only	accounts	for	about	5	per	
cent.	However,	 ICS	 is	 the	most	 active	of	 all	
the	Islamist	organizations.	What	also	is	clear	
is	 that	 violence	 by	 these	 organizations	 is	
relatively	 non-lethal,	 as	 they	 all	 register	






Figure	 2	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 single	
events	of	student	and	campus	violence	in	the	
1991-2018	 period.	 We	 can	 see	 that	 2013	
clearly	 formed	 a	 peak	 in	 student	 violence,	
with	 many	 Islamist	 student	 organizations	
involved.	2013	was	the	most	violent	year	in	
Bangladesh	since	1991.	It	was	not	only	a	pre-
electoral	 year,	 but	 Jamaat-e-Islami	 also	
organized	protests	against	the	conviction	of	
key	 members	 of	 its	 leadership	 in	 the	 War	
Crime	Tribunals,	and	security	forces	cracked	
down	on	Jamaat-e-Islami	in	different	parts	of	
the	 country.	Moreover,	 the	 year	 saw	 large-
scale	 protests	 organized	 by	 the	 Islamist	
Hefazat-e-Islam	 (HeI),	 demanding	 the	
enactment	 of	 a	 blasphemy	 law,	 followed	
again	 by	 a	 crackdown	 by	 state	 security	
forces.	The	amendment	of	the	constitution	to	


















see	 very	 high	 levels	 of	 student	 violence,	 it	
was	in	this	period	by	far	the	most	important	
form	 of	 political	 violence,	 registering	
between	53	per	cent	and	61	per	cent	of	all	







the	 direct	 result	 of	 the	 military-backed	
caretaker	government	ban	on	party-political	
activity.	 What	 this	 period	 shows	 is	 that	
political	violence	can	be	controlled,	if	there	is	
a	concerted	effort	at	the	centre	to	do	so.	Of	
course,	 in	 2007-8	 this	 was	 not	 done	 by	 a	
democratically	elected	government.	
	
Table	 4	 and	 5	 respectively	 present	 the	
percentage	of	violent	incidents	in	which	each	







three	 indicators.	 This	 became	 more	







student	 groups,	 certainly	 under	 the	 last	
Hasina	 III	 government	(2014-2018),	where	





and	 potency	 of	 a	 particular	 group,	 which	
means	 that	 during	 times	 of	 democratic	
competition	 levels	 of	 inter-party	 violence	
tend	 to	 be	 higher	 than	 during	 periods	 of	
authoritarian	 resurgence.	 In	 short,	 political	
violence,	 including	 student	 violence,	
between	 parties	 is	 a	 sign	 for	 existing	
democratic	 competition	 in	 Bangladesh,	
while	 the	decline	of	violent	activities	of	 the	




student	 violence	 (Table	 6).	 This	
disaggregated	data	makes	it	possible	to	get	a	
better	 understanding	 of	 the	 role	 student	
violence	plays	at	the	local	level,	and	certainly	
in	 university	 cities	 as	 Upazila	 boundaries	
overlap	 with	 the	 city	 corporation	
boundaries.	























As	 Table	 6	 shows,	 there	 is	 quite	 some	





Hathazari	 is	 another	 extreme	 example,	 but	
this	can	be	easily	explained	as	this	otherwise	
rural	Upazila	just	north	of	Chittagong	city	is	
also	 the	 home	 of	 Chittagong	 University.	 A	
similar	 dynamic	 is	 playing	 out	 in	 Kushtia	
Upazila,	 the	 home	 of	 Khustia	 Islamic	
University,	 which	 saw	 large-scale	 violence,	
certainly	in	2013.	And	again,	this	is	also	true	
for	 Savar	 on	 the	 outskirts	 of	 Dhaka,	 which	
has	an	industrial	center,	but	is	also	home	to	
Jahangirnagar	University.	 In	contrast	 to	 the	
city	corporations	where	many	other	groups	
are	 engaged	 in	 political	 violence,	 in	 more	
rural	 locations	 like	 the	 ones	 mentioned	
above	 the	 universities	 really	 become	 the	
focal	point	of	violence.	
	
Chittagong	 city	 itself	 is	 also	 interesting,	 as	
almost	half	 of	 all	 violence	 involved	 student	
groups,	 but	 here	 students	 mostly	
participated	in	violence	off	campus.	In	Sylhet,	






(Public)	 Universities	 are	 a	 better	 indicator	
than	 colleges	 for	 high	 shares	 of	 student	
violence.	 Regional	 centers,	 like	 Bogra,	
Gazipur	 or	 Narayanganj,	 which	 have	
important	 colleges,	 but	 no	 university	 see	 a	
lesser	share	of	students	in	political	violence.	
Khulna	 city	 to	 some	 extent	 shares	 this	
characteristic,	 as	student	politics	 is	 banned	
in	Khulna	University	by	the	government	(see	






Zooming	 in	 on	 the	 2008-2018	 period,	 we	
gain	 crucial	 insights	 into	 the	 latest	
developments	in	student	violence.	After	the	
2008	elections	brought	Awami	League	(AL)	







on	 campus,	 allowing	 it	 to	 extend	 this	
dominance	even	to	JCD	and	ICS	strongholds.	
	
Figure	 3	 shows	 the	 number	 of	 events	 and	
wounded	 and	 lethal	 casualties	 for	 both	
student	 violence	 and	 overall	 political	
violence.	It	allows	us	to	get	a	better	sense	of	
the	 general	 trends,	 also	 looking	 at	 the	
intensity	 of	 violence.	 2008,	 which	 was	 still	
largely	under	the	caretaker	government	saw	




this	 was	 achieved	 2016	 and	 2017	 saw	
markedly	 less	 events	 of	 political	 violence,	
before	a	slight	resurgence	in	violence	in	the	
2018	 electoral	 year.	 Still,	 it	 was	 limited,	
certainly	compared	to	other	electoral	years.	
In	 the	 case	 of	 Bangladesh	 violence	 is	 most	




confirms	 the	 overall	 trends	 we	 have	
discussed	before,	but	the	addition	of	data	on	
wounded	and	 lethal	 casualties	allows	us	 to	
get	a	better	grip	on	the	intensity	of	violence	
for	 the	 2008-2018	 period.	 While	 student	
violence	 has	 always	 been	 less	 lethal	 than	
other	forms	of	violence,	what	the	data	shows	
is	 that	 there	 is	 an	 important	 spatial	
dimension	to	this.	In	places	like	Dhaka,	Savar,	
Kushtia	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	Bogra,	 lethal	
casualties	are	markedly	below	expectations	
(when	 looking	 at	 the	 events	data).	 In	 other	
places	 like	 Barisal,	 Rajshahi	 and	 Sylhet,	
student	 violence	 accounts	 for	 a	 very	 large	







campus,	 this	 leads	 to	 proportionally	 more	
lethal	 casualties.	 	 One	 factor	 that	 could	
explain	this	imbalance	is	that	campuses	are	
the	 site	 of	 more	 petty	 everyday	 inter-	 and	
intra-group	 violence	 –	 for	 example,	 over	
women,	disrespectful	behavior	 in	 front	of	a	






specific	 student	 groups	 play	 in	 violence	 in	
Upazila	and	university	towns.	It	is	clear	that	
BCL	is	by	far	most	active	in	violence	and	this	






















much	more	mixed.	 In	Dhaka	 it	 is	 clear	 that	
opposition	 student	 groups	 are	 relatively	
weak,	 but	 in	 other	 places	 like	 Rajshahi	 or	
Khulna,	opposition	student	groups	continue	
to	play	a	role.	 It	 is	interesting	 that	 in	many	
places	the	opposition	group	most	engaged	in	
violence	 is	not	 JCD,	but	rather	 ICS,	showing	
their	 importance	 on	 many	 university	
campuses.		
	
In	 Kushtia,	 where	 the	 Islamic	 University	 is	
located,	ICS	records	a	surprisingly	low	share	
in	 violence,	 notwithstanding	 the	 2013	
violence	about	the	war	crime	tribunals.	This	
may	partly	be	explained	by	 ICS	domination	
and	 the	 concurrent	 weakness	 of	 BCL’s	




Given	 the	 historical	 importance	 of	 ICS	 in	
Chittagong	 ICS’s	 share	 in	 both	 Chittagong	







	The	 role	 of	 ICS	 becomes	 even	 more	
pronounced	 when	 we	 look	 at	 the	 role	 of	
factional	 violence.	 As	 is	 also	 true	 for	 their	
parent	party	JeI,	ICS	registers	very	low	levels	
of	factional	violence	(at	less	than	1	per	cent	
of	 all	 its	 engagement	 in	 violence),	 while	
violence	 within	 BCL	 and	 with	 other	 AL	
organizations	 accounts	 for	 more	 than	 a	
quarter	 of	 all	 their	 violent	 encounters	 and	
almost	15	per	cent	for	JCD.	This	is	even	more	
pronounced	in	key	university	towns	who	all	
register	higher	 shares	of	 factional	 violence,	
with	 Dhaka,	 Chittagong	 (including	























are	 in	 opposition	 and	 thus,	 normally	 less	
engaged	 in	 factional	 fighting.	 One	 would	







become	 gradually	 less	 engaged	 in	 violence,	
and	thus	marginalized.	The	peak	in	violence	
in	 2013	 is	particularly	 pronounced	 for	 ICS.	
Afterwards	 ICS’	 share	 dropped	 to	 almost	
zero	in	2008.	
	














on	 qualitative	 research	 –	 stemming	 from	
interview	 responses	 –	 shed	 light	 on	 the	
functioning	 of	 student	 politics	 in	 the	
different	 localities	 and	 the	 role	 of	 violence	
therein.	 While	 we	 stress	 the	 distinctions	
between	each	case,	and	the	way	that	the	local	
context	 is	 indeed	 important	 to	 understand	









opposition	 to	 their	rivals	 in	 JCD	and	 ICS,	 in	
reality	 many	 of	 their	 everyday	 political	
struggles	 are	 with	 other	 BCL	 activist.	 This	
factionalism	 is	 present	 in	 student	 halls,	 on	
campuses,	 but	 also	 in	 relation	 to	 local	 or	
national	political	leaders.		
	
Secondly,	 student	 halls	 are	 the	 main	
organizing	unit	in	campus	politics.	Halls	are	
the	 university	 dormitories.	 They	 form	 the	
main	 basis	 of	 recruitment	 and	 a	 major	
inducement	–	in	the	form	of	free	lodging	–	for	
people	 to	 join	 student	 politics.	 The	 way	
students	control	seats	 in	student	halls	(and	
common	 rooms)	 is	 considered	 a	 basic	
feature	 of	 all	 residential	 universities.	 Halls	
also	 give	 more	 senior	 student	 politicians	
basic	 access	 to	 manpower,	 in	 the	 form	 of	
first-year	 students	who	 are	 incentivized	 or	
forced	to	join	protests,	processions	and	other	
programs	organized	 to	 show	the	 individual	
capacity	 of	 student	 politicians	 to	 organize	
manpower	
	













benefits.	 Students	 receive	 patronage	 and	
shelter	 from	 city	 politicians	 and	 students	
work	for	them	in	elections,	and	when	there	is	
a	 need	 to	 organize	 processions.	 Some	
activists	 did	 not	 consider	 this	 influence	




“City politicians always 
try to control the 
campus. [I]t is better to 
follow or take shelter 
from city politicians. I 
have worked many times 
[during] city elections. 
They always call on us 
for political functions. 
[B]oth are beneficiaries 






Fourth,	 personal	 connections	 are	 very	
important.	Many,	 if	not	most	of	 the	student	
activists	 interviewed	 of	 BCL	 and	 JCD	 have	
family	members	who	were	or	are	also	active	
in	(student)	politics.	This	gives	them	not	only	
“education”	 in	 politics,	 but	 also	 already	
direct	 access	 to	 political	 party	 patrons,	
through	 their	 family	 relations.	 Student	
activists	 without	 this	 political	 family	
background	 often	 face	 more	 difficulties	 in	
establishing	a	position	for	themselves.		
	





factional	 struggles,	 but	 at	 least	 on	 some	
campus’,	violence	between	BCL	and	ICS	has	




Party	 leaders	 are	 considered	 capable	 of	
ensuring	 peace	 on	 campus,	 or	 inciting	
student	violence.	In	Khulna,	for	example,	the	
mayor	was	seen	as	 the	key	person	to	settle	
factional	 student	 disputes	 peacefully,	
although	 others	 saw	 this	 as	 maybe	 only	 a	
temporary	stalemate.	
	
Finally,	 the	 2019	 DUCSU	 elections	 have	
shown	 the	 gendered	 nature	 of	 student	
politics	 and	 violence.	 Not	 only	 are	 most	
student	activist’s	men,	women	are	often	only	












disturbing	 departure	 from	 this	 norm.	
Women	 were	 often	 thought	 to	 integrate	










The	 capital	 Dhaka	 with	 a	 population	 of	
roughly	20	million	is	by	far	the	largest	city	in	
Bangladesh	 and	 the	 nucleus	 of	 a	 highly	
centralized	 political	 system.	 Similarly,	 DU,	
has	 always	 been	 at	 the	 center	 of	 student	
politics.	It	is	important	to	note	that	Dhaka	is	
home	 to	 many	 other	 private	 and	 public	




DU,	 established	 in	 the	 colonial	 period	 in	
1921,	is	the	oldest	university	in	Bangladesh	
with	a	student	body	of	approximately	38.000	
“The boys who do 
politics, they become 
really aggressive 
sometimes. That’s why 
general students don’t 
like them. But females 
who do politics, they 
don’t become 
aggressive.  That’s why 
girls are more popular 










as	 the	 countries	 founding	 father	 Sheikh	
Mujibur	 Rahman,	 current	 Prime	 Minister	
Sheikh	Hasina	 and	2006	Nobel	Peace	Prize	




as	 well	 as	 non-partisan	 student	 politics	 as	
well	 as	 the	 forefront	 of	 all	 major	 student	
movements.	 DU	 thus	 provides	 a	 model	 for	
the	 ruling	 party’s	 student	 wing,	 whose	





DU’s	 nationwide	 importance	 in	 student	
politics	 is	 corroborated	 further	 by	 the	
prominent	position	of	its	 leaders.	The	 large	
majority	 of	 members	 of	 the	 BCL	 central	
committee,	 for	 example,	 are	 DU	 students.	
The	 president	 and	 general	 secretary	 of	
central	BCL	have	always	been	selected	from	
the	 DU	 BCL	 committee.	 And	 many	 high-
ranking	AL	leaders,	such	as	current	general	
secretary	 Obaidul	 Quader,	 and	 MP	 and	
member	of	the	AL	council	Tofail	Ahmed,	have	
a	history	in	DU	based	student	politics.	DU	is	
thus	 considered	 the	main	 breeding	 ground	
for	future	national	level	politicians.	
											
The	 organization	 and	mobilization	 capacity	
of	 the	 incumbent	 student	 wing	 is	 key	 to	
ensure	 absolute	 control	 on	 campus.	
Opposition	 student	 organizations	 are	
traditionally	less	visibly	active	at	DU	than	at	
other	educational	institutions	in	the	country.	
Only	when	 the	 organizational	 structures	 of	
the	 ruling	 parties’	 student	 wing	 are	
underdeveloped,	 do	 opposition	 activities	
and	 claims	 over	 campus	 control	 become	
more	visible.	This	is	particularly	true	for	ICS,	




As	 student	 organizations’	 main	 source	 of	
power	 is	 their	 mobilization	 capacity,	 the	
control	over	male	halls	marks	the	backbone	
of	their	organizational	capacity	and	political	





March	 2019	 has	 influenced	 the	 political	
landscape	 of	 the	 campus	 and	 might	 have	
effects	 on	 student	politics	 in	 other	parts	 of	
the	country.			
	
4.1.1 City politics in Dhaka  
Compared	to	other	cases	in	this	report,	city	
politics	 and	 city	 politicians	 have	 a	 very	
limited	 impact	 on	 DU	 student	 politics.	
Instead,	DU	politics	is	dominated	by	national	





Quota	 Reform	 Movement	 or	 Road	 Safety	
movement	 and	 the	 concomitant,	 violent	
street	 agitations	 –	 took	 center	 stage	 at	 DU	
and	its	surrounding	areas.		
	












leaders	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 maintain	
patronage	relations	with	student	leaders	to	
further	 their	 own	 influence	 in	 the	 party.	
While	 ideological	 commitment	 can	 be	 one	
driver	 of	 student	 political	 participation	
monetary	 inducements,	 provision	 of	
facilities,	 favoritism,	 and	 access	 to	
government	 jobs	 or	 business	 opportunities	
also	play	a	role.		
	
The	 constitutions	 of	 both	 BCL	 and	 JCD	
theoretically	provide	for	an	electoral	process	
to	 fill	 leadership	 positions	 and	 form	
committees.	 However,	 it	 has	 become	
common	practice	that	leaders	are	selected	in	
complicated	 lobbying	 events	 based	 on	 a	










symbolic	 and	 (unofficial)	 operational	
headquarters	 of	 the	 ruling	 party’s	 student	
wing.	It	is	here	where	the	central	leaders	and	
DU	 leaders	 of	 BCL	 come	 to	 meet	 with	
activists,	 followers	and	other	party	 leaders.	
The	 Modhur	 Canteen	 was	 established	
together	 with	 the	 University	 in	 1921	 and	
adjacent	 to	 the	 DUCSU	 office	 marked	 the	






and	 around	 the	 canteen.	 Activists	 and	
leaders	 from	 all	 levels	 and	 regions	 come	
there	 to	 meet	 with	 them	 and	 show	 their	
support	 and	 manpower.	 Not	 only	 students	
frequent	 the	 canteen,	 but	 also	 the	 upper	
echelons	 of	 the	 ruling	 party	 and	 the	
government,	including	MPs	and	Ministers.			
 
4.1.2 Data on student violence in Dhaka 
As	 mentioned	 above,	 Dhaka	 remains	 the	
single	most	 violent	 location	 in	 Bangladesh,	
not	 surprisingly	 given	 its	 large	 population	
“Connections to the 
central party leaders are 
important. […] 
Recommendation is a 
big factor; you have to 
be noticed by them. 
This connection with 
the mother party is very 
important for power 










campus	 and	 student	 violence	 more	 in	
general.		It	is	clear	that	student	violence	has	
maintained	 a	 continuous	 presence	
throughout	the	period	under	review.	Student	
violence	 spiked	 in	 election	 years,	 when	
students	 also	 engaged	 in	 violence	 off	
campus.	 While	 students	 always	 have	
engaged	in	violence	off	campus	2018	was	an	
extreme	 example,	 with	 very	 high	 levels	 of	
student	 violence	 and	 low	 levels	 of	 campus	
violence.	 This	 suggests	 that	 in	 the	 last	
electoral	year	student	forces	were	primarily	









Given	 the	 full	 control	 of	 BCL	 in	Dhaka	 and	
given	 that	 violence	 is	 a	 sign	 of	 a	 relative	
political	 openness	 in	 Bangladesh,	 it	 is	 not	
surprising	 that	 JCD	 and	 ICS	 are	 fairly	
marginal	 in	 Dhaka	 violence.	 Given	 that	
Dhaka	student	politics	is	deeply	intertwined	
with	 national	 politics,	 space	 for	 the	
















BCL,	 certainly	 in	 relation	 to	 JCD,	 is	 of	
relatively	 recent	 nature.	 	 Throughout	 the	
1990s	 and	 in	 the	 BNP	 dominated	 early	
2000s,	 JCD	 matched,	 and	 in	 2002-2006	
superseded,	 BCL	 violence.	 	 It	 is	 only	 after	
2008	 that	 we	 see	 an	 extreme	 discrepancy	
between	BCL	and	JCD,	with	BCL	engagement	





is	 2013,	 when	 ICS	 threw	 its	 full	 weight	




student	 groups,	 and	 sometimes	 at	 higher	
rates	 than	 inter-party	 violence	 (Figure	 7).	
Factional	 infighting	 has	 grown	 in	 strength	
since	 1991,	 with	 the	 ruling	 party	 student	
group	 being	 ever	 more	 prone	 to	 factional	
infighting.	This	was	 at	 its	peak	 in	2002	 for	
JCD.	 However,	 after	 BNP	 has	 lost	 power	 at	
the	national	level,	factional	violence	has	been	
steadily	 decreasing.	 For	 BCL,	 factional	
violence	 increased	 since	 2008,	 regularly	
being	 more	 important	 than	 non-factional	
violence.	
 
4.1.3 Student politics at Dhaka University  
While	the	Modhur	Canteen	can	be	identified	
as	the	main	meeting	place	for	student	leaders	
of	 the	 ruling	 party’s	 student	wing,	 it	 is	 the	
student	halls	where	everyday	politicking	and	
recruitment	 of	 activists	 takes	 place.	 The	
following	 section	 on	 “political	 graduation”	
outlines	generically	the	mechanisms	at	play	
in	what	 is	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	seat	or	
hall	 politics,	 which,	 most	 pronounced	 in	
Dhaka,	 is	central	for	understanding	student	
politics	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 country.	



















4.1.3.1 Political graduation   
Apart	from	following	their	academic	duties,	
male	 students	 at	 DU	 are	 forced	 to	 follow	a	
parallel	 system,	 which	 Aynul	 Islam	 and	
Mehedi	 Hasan	 Babu	 coined	 “political	




Here	 “political	 graduation”	 refers	 to	 the	
process	 by	 which	 (general)	 students	 are	
recruited	 as	 activists	 and	 (potentially)	
ascend	 to	 become	 leaders.	 In	 principle	 the	
same	process	is	in	place	under	AL	as	well	as	
BNP	 rule.	 The	 ruling	 party’s	 student	 wing	
takes	over	 the	student	halls	and	 introduces	
the	 system	 in	 their	 favor,	 especially	 by	
engaging	 in	 so-called	 ‘seat-politics’.	 Seat	
politics	means	 that	 a	place/bed	 to	 sleep	 in	
the	hall	is	made	contingent	on	participation	
in	the	ruling	parties	student	wing	activities.			
Since	AL	has	been	 in	power	 for	 the	past	10	
years,	BCL	controls	all	the	male	halls	at	DU.	
Each	hall	is	run	by	a	BCL	committee	led	by	a	
president	 and	 general	 secretary.	 These	
committees	 are	 subordinated	 to	 the	
University	level	committee,	which	in	turn	is	




on	 the	 same	 hierarchy	 level	 as	district	 and	
city	corporation	committees.	While	this	also	
applies	theoretically	to	DU,	in	practice	DU	de	




positions	 for	 activists.	 The	 hall	 committee	
president	 and	 general	 secretary,	 however,	
are	 usually	 more	 powerful	 as	 they	 have	 a	
larger	 mobilization	 capacity.	 This	 also	
applies	 to	 colleges	 that	 are	 either	
subordinated	 to	 the	 district	 or	 city	
committees.	 The	 hierarchical	 relationship	
between	 college	 committees	 and	 upazila	
(subdistrict)	committees	 (district)	 or	 thana	
(police	 station)	 committees	 (city)	 depends	
on	the	local	power	structures	and	leadership	
as	 well	 as	 the	 size	 and	 importance	 of	 the	
colleges	 as	 well	 as	 the	 seniority	 of	 its	
students.	 In	 Bangladesh	 there	 are	 four	
different	 kinds	 of	 colleges:	 1.	 only	 11-12th	
grade	 (College	 B);	 2.	 11-12th	 grade	 and	
honor’s	 (undergraduate)	programs	(College	
A	 or	 B);	 3.	 only	 honor’s	 and	 master’s	
programs	(College	A);	4.	both	11-12th	grade,	
honor’s	and	master’s	programs	(College	A).	
College	 types	 2,	 3	 and	 4	 are	 commonly	
administratively	 attached	 to	 the	 National	
University	Bangladesh.			
	
Officially,	 student	 recruitment	 and	
committees	 start	 only	 from	 11th	 grade,	 but	
there	 is	 evidence	 that	 school	 children	 are	
recruited	 as	 activists	 and	 participate	 in	
political	 activities	 such	 as	 processions	 at	 a	
much	earlier	age.	In	districts,	the	union	level	
committees	are	subordinated	to	the	upazila	






for	 example,	 BCL	 split	 some	 bigger	 wards	
into	 two	 separate	 committees	 to	
accommodate	more	activists.	However,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 note	 that	 full-fledged	
committees	 do	 not	 necessarily	 exist	
everywhere	 and	 can	 also	 depend	 on	 local	
party	 leaders’	 influence	 and	 organizational	
capacity,	which	in	turn	signals	their	value	to	
the	 party	 and	 influences	 his/her	 career	
possibilities.	 Furthermore,	 student	 wing	
committees	 only	 exist	 officially	 in	 public	











key	 positions	 in	 each	 committee	 as	 they	
appoint	 the	 other	 committee	 members.	
Committee	sizes	vary	between	a	 few	dozen	
to	 several	 hundred	 members.	 The	 ruling	
party	 usually	 is	 able	 to	 recruit	many	more	
members	 as	 well	 as	 organize	 committees	
than	 the	 opposition.	 Positions	 in	 these	
committees	range	from	vice	president,	 joint	
secretary	 and	 organizational	 secretary	 to	
inter	 alia	 sports	 secretary	 or	
communications	 secretary.	While	 there	 are	
also	 hierarchies	 between	 these	 positions,	











































Formally,	 the	 president	 and	 general	
secretary	of	the	center,	university,	district	or	
city	are	elected	on	so-called	BCL	councils.	But	





secretary	 have	 to	 provide	 the	 official	
signature	for	the	appointment	of	university,	
district	 and	 city	 president	 and	 general	
secretary.	 However,	 their	 decision	 is	
influenced	by	local	or	national	level	leaders,	










inexpensive	 university	 halls	 if	 they	 seek	 to	
pursue	their	studies.	Each	hall	is	divided	into	
several	 blocks	 or	 factions,	 led	 by	 different	




Apart	 from	 some	 new	 halls	 and	 the	 female	
hall,	 the	 university	 administration	 has	
almost	no	control	over	the	allocation	of	seats.	
	



















students	 live	 together	 under	 severely	
cramped	 conditions	 in	 a	 room	 that	 is	
otherwise	designed	for	a	maximum	of	six	to	
eight	 students.	 In	 some	 larger	 halls	 the	
student	 leaders	 use	 big	 hall	 rooms	 as	
ganarooms	 in	which	 they	 house	more	 than	
200	students.	 In	smaller	halls	balconies	are	
also	used	as	ganarooms.	As	 these	balconies	
are	 commonly	 secured	 with	 iron	 grilles,	
students	 often	 refer	 to	 these	 poor	 sleeping	
arrangements	 as	 prison.	 First	 and	 second	
year	 students	 predominately	 occupy	 the	
ganarooms	while	other	rooms	in	the	hall	are	
reserved	 for	 senior	 students	 who	 have	
showed	satisfactory	political	performance	in	
their	first	two	years.		Some	students	remain	
in	 the	 hall	 who	 participated	 in	 political	
activities	in	their	first	years,	but	now	simply	
“We were staying 
[sleeping] in the games 
room of the hall. 
Normally, a thousand 
students can be housed 
in the hall but now it has 
increased to 3200. When 
a boy comes from the 
village to Dhaka 
University, he has to 
learn the [proper] 
behavior. That is why the 













guest	 room	 indicates	 a	 specific	 room,	 it	 is	
synonymously	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 specific	
activity.	Usually	after	10:00	pm	the	different	
groups	or	blocks	of	BCL	gather	either	in	this	
guest	 room,	 another	 large	 room	 or	 a	
ganaroom.	
	
The	 main	 purpose	 of	 the	 guest	 room	 is	 to	
establish	 authority	 and	 to	 manage	 and	
control	 the	 new	 students.	 Here	 first-year	
students	 are	 introduced	 to	 the	 rules	 or	
political	culture	in	the	halls	and	on	campus.	













to	 stay	 in	 the	
ganaroom	 or	 become	 eligible	 for	 better	
accommodation.	 Senior	 students	 monitor	
everyday	activities.	In	these	guest	rooms	first	
year	 students	 receive	 feedback,	 which	 can	




nationalism,	 the	 heroic	 struggle	 for	
independence	and	leadership	cult.	 It	 is	also	
here	where	 they	start	 to	develop	their	 first	
ideas	about	a	certain	leadership	style,	which	
is	 continuously	 reproduced	 in	 the	 political	
context	of	Bangladesh	manifesting	a	certain	




or	 commemoration	 events	 students	 are	
expected	to	participate	in,	these	guest	rooms	
are	 also	 used	 for	 preparation.	 Babu	 and	
Islam	 thus	 suggest	 that	guest	 rooms	can	be	
regarded	as	small	training	institutes	in	which	
students	 are	 forced	 to	 learn	 and	 practice	




halls	 are	 formed	 based	 on	 regional	
connections.	 Newcomers	 can	 find	 phone	
numbers	 of	 regional	 or	 block	 leaders	 on	





leader.	 The	 main	 block	 leader	 is	 usually	
followed	 by	 three	 or	 more	 leaders,	 mostly	
master	 level	students,	who	are	regarded	as	
second	 in	 command	 of	 that	 block.	 Under	
these	leaders	there	are	forth	and	third	year	
“My role model is 
Hitler. I also support 
extreme nationalism. 
Suppose Israel is my 
country and I am 
controlling South Asia. I 
would also want this for 
Bangladesh. Hitler did 
everything for his 
nation, this inspires me. 
That is why he is my 
role model since my 










are	 usually	 selected	 from	 the	 blocks	 in	 a	
negotiation	 process,	 which	 includes	 the	
leadership	 of	 central	 and	DU	 committee	 to	





the	 DU	 and	 central	 committee.	 The	 hall	
president	and	general	secretary	are	selected	
based	 on	 various	 factors	 such	 as	 regional	




head	 of	 the	 committee	 but	 in	 practice	 the	
president	and	general	secretary	share	equal	
importance	 and	 their	 rivalry	 is	 often	 the	
basis	of	factional	infighting.		
	




by	 them.	The	 leadership	 in	a	hall	motivates	
and	 encourages	 engaging	 in	 violence	 by	
depicting	it	as	an	act	of	bravery,	power	and	
individual	 show	 of	 strength.	 Apart	 from	
inter-party	 clashes/violence,	 which	 have	
been	 rare	 at	 DU	 in	 the	 past	 decade	 due	 to	
BCL’s	 strong	 hold	 over	 the	 campus,	 the	
second-year	 students,	 usually	 initiate	other	
conflicts	 on	 and	 off	 campus.	 Second	 year	
students	 are	 in-charge	 of	 the	 first-year	
students.	 They	 use	 them	 for	 personal	
reasons	such	as	beating	up	shopkeepers	who	
refuse	to	serve	them	for	free,	or	serve	them	
late,	 as	 well	 as	 beating	 up	 fellow	 students	
who	 disobey	 them.	 They	 are	 also	 used	 for	
intimidating	 or	 vandalizing	 roadside	 shops	
for	 extortion.	 On	 campus	 these	 student	
groups	are	often	seen	rushing	to	the	nearby	
market	 areas	 like	 Shahbag,	 New	 Market,	
Nilkhet,	 or	 Chankharpool	 to	 fight	 for	 their	
seniors	 when	 they	 have	 created	 a	 conflict	
with	 the	 local	 shopkeepers	 or	 the	 general	
public.		
	
Sometimes	 first	 year	 students	 are	 sent	 to	
parks	on	or	near	 the	 campus	 to	beat	up	or	
intimidate	 outsiders	 and	 harass	 couples.	 If	
orders	are	not	obeyed	or	certain	students	are	
not	 as	 active	 in	 these	 exercises,	 senior	
leaders	order	their	own	group	mates	to	beat	
them	up	as	punishment.	 In	 the	past,	before	
the	 e-tender	process	was	 introduced,	 these	
student	 groups	went	 to	 government	offices	
to	 use	 their	 manpower	 to	 capture	 tender	






as	 powerful	 and	 a	 potential	 leader	 in	 the	










are	 expected	 to	 be	 at	 the	 forefront	 during	
major	violent	clashes.	In	return	they	receive	
much	 earlier	 better	 accommodation	 in	 the	
halls	than	their	peers.	In	their	rooms	one	can	
commonly	 find	 steel	 pipes,	 bamboo	 sticks,	
large	 daggers,	 knives,	 and	 sometimes	 even	
crude	bombs	or	firearms.		
	










rallies,	 also	 called	 “showdowns”,	which	 are	
used	 by	 factions	 to	 physically	 show	 their	
presence	 in	a	certain	territory	and	perform	
strength.	To	 give	 “protocol”,	 however,	 does	
not	 only	mean	 to	 provide	 protection	 but	 it	
can	 also	 mean	 to	 keep	 a	 senior	 leader	
company	 signaling	 his	 importance	 and	
boosting	his	public	performance.	The	cadres	
either	own	or	are	given	motorbikes	to	drive	
the	 leaders	 around	 or	 sit	 in	 the	 back	 to	
provide	 protocol.	 Cadres,	 however,	 are	 not	
the	 only	 ones	 “giving	 protocol”	 to	 the	 top	
leaders,	 ambitious	 candidates	 aiming	 for	
higher	 level	 positions	 regularly	 accompany	
and	 seek	 proximity,	 especially	 in	 public,	 to	
higher	 level	 leaders.	 A	 practice	 mimicked	
from	 their	 role	 models	 from	 the	 mother	
party,	 which	 is	 reproduced	 in	 student	
politics	maintain	a	certain	political	culture.		
			
To	 sum	 up,	 in	 their	 first-year	 students	 are	
forced	 to	 become	 accustomed	 to	 violence	
and	 are	 trained	 to	 be	 aggressive	 and	
participate	in	various	political	activities	such	
as	 party	 procession	 and	 commemorations.	
As	first	year	students	are	the	main	strength	
of	 the	 ruling	 party	 in	 terms	 of	 manpower,	
building	 their	 capacity	 for	 violence	 and	
street	 politics	 is	 key	 to	 suppress	 dissent,	
demands	 or	 movements	 from	 general	
students	 or	 other	 political	 parties	 and	 to	
ensure	 hegemonic	 control	 over	 the	 public	
space.				
	
The	 most	 active	 and	 loyal	 second	 year	
students	 are	 invited	 to	 oversee	 the	 guest	
room	and	teach	first	year	students	what	they	
learned	 in	 the	 first	 year.	 They	 are	 also	 the	
main	 recruiters	 of	 new	 block	members.	 As	




Third-	 and	 fourth-year	 cadres	 are	
considered	 rising	 leaders	 of	 groups	 and	
blocks.	The	number	of	active	members	also	
lessens	 in	 these	 years.	 Ambitious	 activists	
maintain	 close	 connections	 with	 their	 hall	
leaders,	 university	 level	 leaders	 as	 well	 as	
“Giving protocol is an 
important factor now-a-
day. If a central leader 
goes somewhere, 
providing him transport, 
staying or walking beside 
him is very effective for 
getting post-positions 





time	 in	 the	 Modhur	 Canteen.	 There	 they	
become	familiar	to	the	university	and	central	
level	 leaders	 and	 start	 to	 create	 networks.	
They	 are	 often	 assigned	 to	 leadership	
positions	 where	 they	 have	 to	 arrange	
manpower	for	events	and	everyday	protocol	
for	top	leaders.	They	are	also	considered	as	
middlemen	 in	 their	 blocks,	 as	 they	 are	 the	
link	between	junior	level	activists	and	senior	
level	 leaders.	 For	 both	 levels	 they	 are	 the	
main	contact	persons	to	help	resolve	any	sort	
of	 issues	 in	 the	 block.	 In	 return,	 they	 are	






assume	 top	 leadership	 positions.	 Currently	
the	 common	 discourse	 posits	 that	 past	
activities	or	sacrifices	made	for	the	party	are	
less	 important	 than	 personal	 connections	
with	 top-level	 leaders	 to	 become	 hall,	
university	 or	 central	 president/general	
secretary.	 Potential	 candidates	 are	 usually	
busy	 providing	 protocol	 to	 central	 leaders.	
They	 also	 keep	 connections	 with	 the	
university	 administration	 and	 Detective	
Branch17.	The	Detective	Branch	is	in	charge	
of	 preparing	 reports	 on	 the	 activities	 of	
different	 leaders	 for	 the	 central	 party	
leadership.	 A	 positive	 report	 is	 crucial	 for	






student	 wing.	 Besides	 patronage	
relationships	 and	 dedication	 to	 the	 party,	
family	background	is	also	considered	in	the	
selection	process	 for	 the	 top	positions.	The	
top	 leaders	 have	 good	 chances	 to	 continue	
their	 political	 career	within	 the	 party	 after	
their	 student	 life.	 Many	 student	 leaders	 at	
this	level	have	to	make	the	trade-off	between	
academic	 excellence	 and	 following	 a	 time-
consuming	 political	 career	 during	 their	
student	life.	Those	who	fail	to	reach	the	top	
leadership	 positions	 are	 thus	 often	 offered	












she	 personally	 interviewed	 and	 appointed	
the	 central	 BCL	 president	 and	 general	
secretary.	 This	 was	 to	 strengthen	 her	 hold	
over	 the	party	and	to	ensure	unity	prior	 to	
the	December	2018	elections.18		
4.1.3.2 DUCSU elections   





historical	 significance	 DUCSU	 is	 sometimes	
also	referred	to	as	the	second	Parliament	of	
Bangladesh.	Concomitant	to	the	co-optation	
of	 student	 politics	 by	 the	 political	 party’s	
student	wings	 in	 the	early	1990s,	however,	
DUCSU	 became	 inactive	 with	 no	 elections	
held	 between	 1990	 and	 2019.	 The	 DUCSU	
office,	located	right	next	to	Modhur	Canteen,	
laid	 abandoned	 for	 almost	 30	 years	 when	




political	 hierarchy	 on	 campus,	 as	 it	 would	
have	 to	operate	parallel	to	 the	existing	BCL	













student	 wings	 of	 the	 opposition	 boycotted	
the	elections.	The	only	organization	that	ran	
against	 BCL	was	 Sadharon	 Chattra	 Adhikar	
Songrokkhon	Porishad,	 an	organization	 that	
gained	 nationwide	 popularity	 for	
spearheading	 the	 Quota	 Reform	Movement	
in	2018.	BCL	won	23	out	of	25	DUCSU	posts.	
Surprisingly,	 Sadharon	 Chattra	 Adhikar	
Songrokkhon	 Porishad	 won	 with	 Nurul	
Haque	 Nur	 the	 vice-president	 position	 as	
well	as	the	position	for	social	welfare.	Out	of	
36	 Vice	 President	 and	 General	 Secretary	
positions	 for	 18	 student	 hall	 committees,	
BCL	 was	 able	 to	 secure	 26	 while	 the	 rest	
went	 to	 independent	 candidates,	 most	 of	
whom	 were	 associated	 with	 the	 Quota	
Reform	Movement.			
	
Most	 of	 the	 hall	 committee	 posts	 won	 by	




Songrokkhon	 Porishad	 DUCSU	 candidates.	
These	 results	 are	 a	 good	 indicator	 of	 the	






more	 neutral	 ground	 of	 other	 university	
buildings.	 However,	 the	 election	 of	 Nur	 as	
Vice-President	and	 the	margin	by	which	he	
won	the	post	came	as	a	surprise.	Given	 the	
irregularities	 in	 voting	 elsewhere,	 it	 is	
unclear	whether	this	was	a	miscalculation	by	





with	 its	 interests	 decided	 by	 national	 level	




ambitions	 of	 its	 student	 leaders.	 It	 is	 also	
where	 the	 ruling	 political	 party	 has	
traditionally	 held	 most	 sway	 over	 the	
campus.	 Hall	 politics	 has	 provided	 the	
central	 focus	 of	 student	 organization	 until	
now.		
	







as	 the	 female	 halls	 might	 provide	 a	
counterweight	 to	 masculinist	 and	 violent	
male	 student	 politics	 and	 offer	 spaces	 to	
discuss	other	means	of	student	engagement	




Chittagong,	 officially	 Chattogram,	 with	
roughly	 3	 to	 4	 million	 inhabitants	 is	 the	
second	 largest	 city	 in	 Bangladesh	 and	 the	
eponymous	 district	 as	 well	 as	 divisional	
capital.	The	coastal	city	with	its	international	
port	 is	 the	 principle	 maritime	 gateway	 to	




The	 city	 is	 home	 to	 a	 range	 of	 renowned	
private	 and	 public	 higher	 educational	
institutions	 such	 as	 Chittagong	 College,	 the	
second	 oldest	 College	 in	 Bangladesh	
established	 in	 1869;	 Government	 Hazi	
Mohammad	 Mohsin	 College	 (1874);	
Government	 College	 of	 Commerce	 (1947);	
Government	 City	 College	 (1954);	 Islamia	
Degree	College	(1964);	 the	private	Premier	
University	 (2001);	 and	 Chittagong	
University	 of	 Engineering	 &	 Technology	
(CUET),	 to	 name	 just	 a	 few.	 All	 of	 these	
educational	institutions	have	active	student	
politics	that	shape	the	political	environment	
in	 the	 city,	 including	 incidents	 of	 political	
violence.			
In	 this	 report,	 however,	 we	 will	 primarily	
focus	on	student	politics	at	the	University	of	
Chittagong,	established	in	1966	and	located	
about	22	km	north	of	 the	 city	 in	Hathazari	
Upazila.	Chittagong	University	(CU)	was	the	
third	university	established	in	East	Pakistan	
after	 Dhaka	 and	 Rajshahi	 University	 and	
remains	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 and	 prestigious	
higher	 educational	 institutions	 in	 the	
country.		
	
4.2.1 City politics in Chittagong  
Under	 AL	 rule	 the	 city	 is	 divided	 between	
two	networks	of	 power.	The	 first	 faction	 is	





leadership	 of	 the	 faction	 from	 his	 recently	
deceased	 (2017)	 father	 A.B.M.	 Mohiuddin	






the	 city	 are	broadly	divided	between	 these	
two	 factions,	 including	 BCL.	 They	 compete	
over	 territorial	 influence	 and	 access	 to	
resources,	 which	 often	 leads	 to	 factional	
violence.	Mayor	A.J.M.	Nasir	Uddin’s	 faction	
seems	to	have	the	advantage	as	his	position	
allows	 his	 followers	 to	 have	 access	 to	 city	
corporation	 resources	 (e.g.	 as	 contractors),	
which	 is	 more	 interesting	 for	 grassroots	
leaders	 and	 activists.	 The	 second	 reason	 is	
the	 death	 of	 popular	 faction	 leader	 A.B.M.	
Mohiuddin	 Chowdhury.	 His	 son	 Nowfel	




The	 most	 influential	 BNP	 leader	 in	
Chittagong	 is	 former	 Minister	 of	 Fisheries	











major	 clashes	 with	 ruling	 party	 members	
and	 law	 enforcement	 agencies.	 The	 AL	
government	 crackdown	 has	 met	 more	
resistance	in	Chittagong	than	elsewhere	but	
has	severely	impeded	the	public	activities	of	
JeI	 and	 ICS	 in	 recent	 years.	 While	 both	
organizations	are	believed	to	be	operational,	
they	 conduct	 their	 activities	 mostly	
underground.						
	
Chittagong	 is	 also	 a	 major	 center	 of	 wider	
Islamist	 politics.	 Madrasa	 teachers	 in	
Chittagong	formed	2010	Hefazat-e-Islam,	the	
Islamic	 pressure	 group	 that	 challenged	 the	
AL	 government	 in	 2013	 with	 a	 major	
nationwide	 movement	 that	 was	 met	 with	
brute	 force	 by	 law	 enforcement	 agencies.	
Prior	 to	 the	 last	 elections,	 however,	 the	AL	
government	felt	 it	had	to	give	in	to	some	of	
the	 groups’	 demands	 to	 appease	 the	 more	
radical	elements	in	society.		
	
Student	 politics	 in	 Chittagong	 is	 strongly	
influenced	by	general	political	trends	in	the	
city	and	the	country.	During	AL’s	 first	 term	
(2008-2013),	BCL	struggled	 to	 take	 control	
of	 the	 various	 educational	 institutions.	 In	





4.2.2 Data on student violence in 
Chittagong and Hathazari 
To	 understand	 the	 situation	 in	 Chittagong,	
we	 have	 to	 look	 at	 Chittagong	 city	
corporation	and	 the	Hathazari	Upazila.	The	
former	 hosts	 a	 number	 of	 colleges	 and	 is	
home	 to	 many	 students	 who	 study	 at	
Chittagong	University.	However,	the	latter	is	
located	 outside	 town	 in	 Hathazari	 Upazila	
and	data	 shows,	 perhaps	 as	a	 result	 of	 this	




student	 violence	 incidents	 (almost	 80	 per	
cent	 of	 all	 student	 violence)	 far	 outnumber	
campus	violence	incidents	and	vice	versa	in	
Hathazari	Upazila	where	on	campus	violence	
is	 dominant	 (at	 about	 67	 per	 cent	 of	 all	
student	violence)(see	below).		
	
Figure	 9	 provides	 data	 on	 the	 overall	
prevalence	 of	 campus	 and	 off	 campus	
student	violence	(with	the	total	violence	for	
comparison).	 What	 is	 obvious	 is	 that	
violence	spiked	from	1996	to	2000,	slumped	
from	 2001	 to	 2008	 and	 has	 been	 on	 the	




Chittagong	 City	 Corporation	 was	 ruled	 by	
BNP	from	1991-1996	after	which	long-term	
mayor	A.	B.	M.	Mohiuddin	Chowdhury	ruled	





While	 Chittagong’s	 AL	 was	 divided	
throughout	Chowdhury’s	rule,	and	until	the	
time	 of	 writing,	 into	 two	 main	 factions,	
Chowdhury	was	able	to	control	JCD	violence	
during	 BNP	 central	 rule	 accounting	 for	 the	
slump	in	student	violence	in	this	period	(see	
also	Figure	10),	while	BNP	(in	power	at	the	
center)	 was	 able	 to	 dampen	 BCL	 violence	
accounting	for	the	relatively	peaceful	2001-
2008	 period.	While	 violence	 was	 relatively	
controlled	 during	 Manju’s	 rule,	 if	 we	
disregard	 the	 2013	 protest,	 violence	 again	














violence	 also	 has	 been	 pronounced,	 with	
major	violence	 in	 the	mid	1990s	when	BCL	
tried	to	dislodge	their	hold	on	campus	and	of	





In	 the	 last	 ten	 years	 (2008-2018),	 BCL	 has	
clearly	been	the	perpetrator	of	most	violence	
in	 the	 area	 (Table	 11).	 What	 is	 also	
interesting,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 effect	
predominantly	 of	 the	 anti-war-crimes	
tribunals	 movement,	 ICS	 is	 much	 more	




Islamist	 force	 engaged	 in	 violence	 in	 the	
period	and	much	more	active	than	its	mother	
party	JeI.		
“The opposition student 
organizations have no 
position on campus. We 
cannot enter the 
campus due to the 






















trends	 are	 not	 so	 easy	 to	 distinguish,	 as	
factional	violence	has	been	prone	to	a	lot	of	
variation.	Overall,	BCL	has	been	more	prone	
to	 factional	 violence	 than	 JCD.	 Factional	
violence	 accounted	 for	 one	 quarter	 of	 all	
violent	events	for	BCL	and	almost	17	per	cent	




2008,	 the	 share	 of	 factional	 BCL	 violence	
rose.	The	highest	levels	of	factional	violence	
overall	 were	 seen	 in	 2018.	 BCL	 factional	
violence	 after	 2010	 might	 have	 been	 the	
result	 of	 an	 open	 struggle	 of	 power	within	
Chittagong	 AL.	 As	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 AL	
mayor,	power	relations	were	not	clear.	
 
4.2.3 Student politics at Chittagong 
University  
When	it	comes	to	our	research	in	Chittagong,	
this	 report	 focuses	 primarily	 on	 student	
politics	 at	 CU.	 What	 sets	 CU	 apart	 from	
universities	 such	 as	 Dhaka	 or	 Rajshahi	
University	 is	 the	 enormous	 size	 of	 the	
campus	and	its	location	22	km	north	of	the	
city.	The	remote	site	has	significantly	shaped	
the	 development	 of	 student	 politics	 on	
campus.	 For	 example,	 student	 political	
activists	and	 leaders	are	barely	 involved	 in	
events	 of	 political	 violence	 in	 the	 city	 and	

























“It is common practice 
for a long time that the 
city leaders have the 
most influence. That’s 
why we go to them. The 
central BCL committee 
has no capacity to 
monitor the everyday 
activities on campus, or 











Facing	 logistical	 difficulties,	 especially	
commuting	 between	 the	 city	 and	 the	
university	 at	 night,	 prevents	 everyday	
involvement	 in	 city	 politics,	 which	 is	 more	
dominated	 by	 the	 BCL	 leaders	 from	 more	
centrally	 located	 educational	 institutions.		
Instead,	BCL	activists	and	leaders	of	CU	only	
support	 the	 city	AL	unit	 for	 larger	political	
events	 such	 as	 campaigning	 for	 local	 and	






committees	 to	 focus	more	on	 their	 campus	
and	 the	 surrounding	 areas,	 which	 in	 most	
cases	comprises	already	a	vast	territory.	The	
distance	between	 city	 and	CU	 campus	 is	 in	



















“I engaged in bogie 
politics from my 
first day of 
university. From 
that day, I dreamed 
of becoming 
president or general 
secretary of my 
organization one 







between	 the	 city	 and	 the	 campus	 they	 are	
often	 stuck	 in	 traffic,	 making	 the	 journey	
unpredictable	in	terms	of	time.		
	
Most	 students,	 especially	 undergraduates,	
thus	use	the	shuttle	train	which	is	operated	
by	 the	 university	during	 the	 day	 and	 takes	
about	45	minutes.	Even	though	some	of	the	
students	 live	 in	 the	 city,	 the	 organizational	
center	of	the	university	committee	is	located	
on	 campus	 and	 thus,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	
their	 activities	 remain	 focused	 on	 the	
campus	and	the	surrounding	areas.		
	
4.2.3.1 Bogie politics 
The	 shuttle	 train	 has	 become	 a	 central	
element	 in	 CU’s	 political	 and	 cultural	 life.	
Students	form	group	identities	based	on	the	
coach	or	bogie	they	ride	in	which	were	given	
names	 and	were	 decorated/painted	 by	 the	






here	 where	 they	 tried	 to	 recruit	 new	
students	 and	 with	 time	most	 of	 the	 bogies	








tradition	 of	 naming	 their	 groups	 and	




























but	 the	 groups	 as	 such	 did	 not	 disappear.	
Logos	and	symbols	of	 the	dominant	groups	
can	still	be	found	on	walls	across	the	campus	
and	 the	 groups	 remain	 active.	 Unable	 to	
recruit	 students	 in	 the	 shuttle	 train,	 bogie	
groups	 reverted	 to	other	 strategies.	During	
“These days are the 
times of propaganda 
politics. The ruling 
party’s student 
organization considers 
politics as a business. 
They extort huge 
amounts of money in 
the name of various 
programs they organize; 
they also take a 
percentage from every 
tender. There is 










the	 admission	 period,	 BCL	 bogie	 factions	
distribute	 business	 cards	 and	 offer	
assistance	 with	 administrative	 issues	 or	
orientation	 on	 campus,	 including	 help	
finding	a	seat	in	a	hall.	From	there	they	will	
be	 brought	 into	 contact	 with	 department,	
regional	 or	 hall	 leaders	 of	 the	 faction	
depending	on	the	identity	of	the	new	student.	
New	students	quickly	learn	that	joining	one	
of	 these	 factions	 gives	 them	 privileges	 on	
campus	 and	 connection	 with	 campus	
political	 leaders	 accelerates	 administrative	
processes.	 These	 informal	 but	 effective	
services,	 facilities	 and	 prospects	 of	 power	




the	 selection	 process	 of	 the	 university	 BCL	
president	 and	 general	 secretary	 post.	
Usually,	the	two	city	factions	receive	one	of	














years	 and	 contrary	 to	 the	 Dhaka	 and	
Rajshahi	case,	central	BCL	leadership	did	not	
even	 personally	 attend	 the	 party	 wing	
council	 on	 campus	 in	 which	 the	 CU	 BCL	
president	 and	 general	 secretary	 would	 be	
selected.	 Instead	 of	 the	 usual	 spectacle	
involving	 a	 large	 stage,	 posters	 and	
processions,	 the	 selection	 was	 negotiated	
behind	closed	doors	with	the	city	AL	leaders.	
This	 further	 corroborates	 the	 limited	




4.2.3.2 Towards hall politics 
Still,	 national	 level	 AL	 and	 BCL	 leadership	
instructed	 the	 recently	 selected	 CU	 BCL	
president	and	general	secretary	to	breakup	
bogie	 politics	 on	 campus	 and	 organize	 hall	
committees	based	on	the	Dhaka	model.		This	
shows	 that	 the	 central	 leadership’s	 main	
concern	after	the	ousting	of	ICS	from	campus	
are	 the	 high	 numbers	 of	 factional	 violence	
and	 lack	 of	 discipline	 within	 the	
organization.	 Violence	 between	 the	 various	
groups	 has	 easily	 erupted	 in	 the	 past	
competing	 over	 resources	 such	 as	 the	 staff	
(academic	 and	 administrative)	 recruitment	
process	on	campus,	the	contracting	process	
of	 infrastructure	 development	 projects	 –	
from	 the	 purchase	 of	 furniture	 and	
equipment	to	vehicles,	as	well	as	controlling	
the	 allocation	 of	 seats	 in	 the	 student	 halls.	
Also,	 violence	 is	 a	 common	 means	 to	
establish	influence	over	various	facilities	on	
campus	 such	 as	 dining	 halls,	 jupri	 (food	
shacks),	bogies,	sports	fields,	or	reading	and	
“There is a proverb in 
our culture: ‘where 
there is money there is 
violence.’ Presently, 
they do politics for 
power everywhere, for 
gaining financial and 
other undue benefits, 
and personal interests 
(University 
administrator (former 










recently	 an	 incident,	 known	 amongst	
students	as	the	HaHa-incident,	triggered	by	
one	factional	leader	commenting	with	HaHa	
on	 a	 Facebook	 post	 by	 another	 factional	
leader,	 resulted	 in	 four	 consecutive	days	of	




one-day	 abductions,	 and	 attacks	 using	
knives,	 bamboo	 sticks,	 metal	 rods	 or	 even	
firearms.	A	common	strategy	that	is	unique	
to	CU	is	the	forced	suspension	of	the	shuttle	




law	enforcement	personal.	As	 a	 reaction	 to	
the	 high	 levels	 of	 violence	 the	 police	
established	a	small	office	at	the	train	station	
on	 campus	 and	 posted	 a	 riot	 tank	 for	
deterrence	at	the	main	entry	gate,	which	was	
the	most	 visual	presence	of	police	we	have	








The	 case	 of	 Chittagong	 and	 particularly	 CU	
offers	new	insights	into	how	student	politics	
is	organized	in	major	urban	centers	outside	
of	 Dhaka.	 What	 stands	 out	 is	 the	 former	
dominance	 of	 ICS	 rather	 than	 JCD	 on	 CU	
campus.	 Like	 elsewhere,	 however,	BCL	has,	
after	 some	 years	 of	 fierce	 clashes	 and	
violence,	consolidated	its	power	on	campus.	







the	 central	 party	 leadership	 is	 trying	 to	
discipline	the	organization,	they	rely	on	the	
two	 city	 AL	 faction	 leaders	 to	 use	 their	
influence	 on	 campus	 to	 curb	 BCL	
factionalism.	 However,	 the	 city	 AL	 leaders	
both	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 expanding	 their	
dominance	over	the	campus	to	reap	financial	
benefits	 as	 well	 as	 manpower	 in	 order	 to	





remote	 location	 and	 shuttle	 train	
communication.	 From	 the	 interviews	 it	
seems	 that	 despite	 its	 ban,	 bogie-based	






cut	 chain	 of	 command	 and	 organizational	
structure	similar	to	DU.		
	
Interestingly,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 significant	
rise	of	female	activists	and	leaders	in	the	past	
few	 years,	 who	 increasingly	 politicize	 the	
female	student	halls	with	two	effects.	On	the	
one	hand,	the	party	is	encroaching	into	new	





issues.	 In	most	 cases	we	 found	 that	 female	
activists	 do	 not	 receive	 the	 same	 attention	
and	 are	 often	 perceived	 as	 ‘ornamental’	 by	
their	 male	 counterparts.	 While	 walking	 at	
the	 front	 of	 most	 processions	 they	 do	 not	
receive	an	equal	or	no	share	of	the	financial	
benefits.	 One	 reason	 female	 activists	
repeatedly	 voiced	 for	 not	 being	 able	 to	
engage	in	student	politics	on	an	equal	level	
as	 their	 male	 counterparts	 was	 their	
restriction	 to	move	 around	 in	 the	 evenings	
and	at	night.	 Some	 felt	 that	 “real	politics	 is	
done	at	night”.	Exceptions	are	daughters	of	
high-level	 politicians	 such	 as	 MPs.	 In	 CU,	
these	 women	 often	 become	 leaders	 of	 the	
female	 activists	 and	 have	 some	 influence	





of	 Bangladesh	 on	 the	 river	 Padma.	 With	 a	
population	 of	 between	 750,000	 and	 one	
million	 it	 is	 the	 capital	 of	 the	 eponymous	
division	and	district	and	was	known	during	
colonial	times	as	“Silk	City”	for	its	central	role	
in	 the	silk	and	 indigo	 trade.	After	partition,	
however,	 Rajshahi	 saw	 itself	 debased	 as	 a	
border	town.	Poorly	connected	to	the	capital	
Dhaka	 and	 cut	 off	 on	 the	 other	 side	 by	 a	
strictly	 monitored	 and	 increasingly	
impermeable	border	with	India,	this	former	

















educational	 institutions	 Rajshahi	 is	 today	
known	as	“city	of	education”.	In	the	absence	
of	 major	 industries	 or	 trade	 centers,	
educational	institutions	are	one	of	the	main	
economic	 drivers	 and	 an	 important	 source	
for	 employment	 in	 the	 city.	Apart	 from	RU,	
Rajshahi	 is	 also	 home	 to	 the	 Rajshahi	
University	 of	 Engineering	 and	 Technology	
(RUET),	 Rajshahi	 College,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
Rajsahi	Government	City	College,	which	are	
“face value, highlighting 
yourself in front of the 
leaders means 
everything in our 






also	major	 hubs	 for	 student	 politics	 in	 the	
city.					
	
4.3.1 City politics in Rajshahi 
Rajshahi	 has	 traditionally	 been	 a	 BNP	
stronghold	since	its	upgrade	to	city	status	in	
1991	 and	was	 ruled	 by	 former	 BNP	mayor	
Minazur	 Rahman	 Minu	 for	 17	 consecutive	
years	 until	 AL	 city	 president	 and	 current	
mayor	 A.H.M.	 Khairuzzaman	 Liton	
superseded	 him	 in	 the	 2008	 Rajshahi	 City	
Corporation	 (RCC)	 elections.	 In	 the	 2013	
elections	Liton	 lost	again	 to	BNP	 candidate	
Bulbul,	an	 intra-party	rival	of	Minu,	only	 to	
win	 again	 in	 a	 highly	 contested	 election	 in	
2018.		
	
Fazle	 Hossain	 Badsha,	 secretary	 of	 the	
Workers	Party	of	Bangladesh	and	part	of	the	
AL	 alliance,	 has	 been	MP	 of	 the	 Rajshahi	2	
constituency	 since	 2008.	 While	 fairly	
popular	 in	 the	 general	 population	 he	 holds	
relatively	little	power	due	to	his	reliance	on	
AL	“muscle”.	In	the	2018	general	election,	he	
could	 only	 beat	 BNP	 candidate	 Minu	 by	 a	
small	 margin	 despite	 widespread	 electoral	
fraud	in	his	favor.	As	elsewhere,	however,	the	




report,	 both	 major	 parties,	 AL	 and	 BNP,	
suffer	 less	 from	intra-party	 factionalism.	As	
organizing	 secretary	 of	 the	 central	 BNP	
committee,	 Minu	 is	 the	 most	 senior	 active	
BNP	politician	in	the	city	and	enjoys	not	only	
widespread	popularity	in	his	own	party	but	
the	 whole	 city.	 Liton	 is	 the	 son	 of	 A.H.M.	
Kamaruzzaman	 one	 of	 the	 four	 national	
leaders	who	was	killed	during	the	so-called	
“jail	 killing	 day”	 in	 the	 course	 of	 Sheikh	
Mujibur’s	 assassination	 in	 1975.	 His	
personal	proximity	to	Sheikh	Hasina	and	the	
central	 AL	 government	 has	 made	 him	 the	
undisputed	 leader	of	 the	urban	political	AL	
machine	 in	Rajshahi.	His	 followers	 call	 him	
the	“father	of	modern	Rajshahi”,	in	reference	
to	 “father	 of	 the	 nation”	 Sheikh	 Mujibur	
Rahman.		
	
As	 compared	 to	 Liton,	 whose	 position	 of	
power	is	solely	owed	to	his	father’s	political	
legacy,	 both	 Minu	 and	 Badsha	 began	 their	
political	 careers	 as	 student	 leaders	 in	
Rajshahi.	 Liton,	 however,	 recognizes	 the	









considered	 a	 JeI	 and	 ICS	 stronghold.	 Their	
influence	 under	 BNP	 was	 concentrated	
mostly	on	RU	and	RUET	(Rajshahi	University	
of	 Engineering	 and	 Technology)	 campus	 as	
well	 as	 in	 the	 wider	 semi-urban	 vicinity.	
According	to	local	public	discourse	many	ICS	
activists	and	leaders	have	settled	with	their	




finalized	 their	 studies.	 In	 recent	 years,	 JeI	
and	ICS	have	gone	underground	in	the	course	
of	 the	 AL	 government	 crackdown.	 Despite	




4.3.2 Data on student violence in Rajshahi 
In	Rajshahi,	student	groups	were	involved	in	
almost	65	per	cent	of	all	incidents	of	political	
violence	 between	 2008-2018,	 which	 is	 the	
highest	 number	 among	 all	 major	 cities	
(Table	 6).	 The	 data	 should	 not	 come	 at	 a	
surprise	for	the	“city	of	education”,	especially	




JCD	 engage	 in	 relatively	 less	 factional	
violence	in	Rajshahi.	This	may	be	explained	
by	 the	 relative	 cohesive	 and	not	 factionally	
divided	AL	and	BNP	party	machines	and,	in	
case	 of	 BCL,	 an	 intense,	 protracted	 and	 at	
times	lethal	struggle	with	ICS	that	united	BCL	
leaders	 and	 activists.	 This	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	
Chittagong	 where	 factionalism	 remained	
regardless	 of	 the	 struggle	 with	 ICS.	 Key	
difference	here	is	the	setup	of	party-political	
leadership,	with	Rajshahi	 under	 the	 almost	
unitary	leadership	of	Liton	and	power	within	
Chittagong	 AL	 divided	 between	 two	
(equally)	powerful	factions.	
Figure	12	shows	the	evolution	of	student	and	
campus	 violence	 from	 1991-2018.	 What	 is	
immediately	 apparent	 is	 that	 most	 student	
violence	 happened	 on	 campus	 and	 only	
limited	violence	outside.	The	only	exception	
was	 in	 2013	 when	 there	 was	 widespread	
deployment	 of	 student	 forces	 off	 campus.	
What	 is	 also	 clear	 is	 that	 Rajshahi	 saw	
relatively	 low	 figures	 of	 student	 violence	
until	2008.	One	reason	might	have	been	the	
firm	 control	 of	 BNP	 Mayor	 Minu.	 BNP	
dominance	 did	 not	 allow	 BCL	 to	 fully	
organize,	 while	 the	 dominating	 figure	 of	
Minu	could	keep	JCD	in	check.	After	2008	we	
see	 a	 marked	 rise	 in	 student	 and	 campus	
violence,	 although	 the	 last	 few	 years	 have	
seen	a	return	to	pre-2008	figures.	
	
Figure	 13	 shows	 that	 JCD	 and	 ICS	
participation	 in	 violent	 events	 exceeds	 that	
of	 BCL	 during	 most	 of	 the	 period	 under	
study.	This	is	certainly	the	case	during	BNP	
periods	 of	 rule	 nationally,	 but	 they	 also	
maintained	 their	 position	 quite	 well	 under	
AL,	which	can	be	traced	back	to	the	longtime	
BNP	mayorship.	This	changes,	however,	after	
2008.	 One	 sees	 a	 clear	 peak	 in	 2009-2010	
where	 BCL	 is	 trying	 to	 consolidate	 its	




JCD.	 The	 BCL	 is	 finally	 able	 to	 consolidate	



















Table	 12	 shows	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	
different	 organizations	 in	 violent	 events	
from	 2008-2018	 and	 confirms	 this	 picture.	
What	stands	out	is	that	ICS	was	involved	in	
more	 than	20	per	cent	of	all	violent	events,	
which	 illustrates	 ICS’s	 former	 strong	
position	in	the	city.	Even	more	interesting	is	
that	 these	 incidents	 account	 for	 almost	 30	
per	 cent	 of	 wounded	 and	 lethal	 casualties.	
This	 shows	 that	 violent	 events	 with	 ICS	
involved	were	relatively	more	brutal.	In	the	
context	 of	 Rajshahi,	 the	 data	 reflects	 the	
fierce	contest	between	ICS	and	BCL	but	even	
more	 the	 lethal	 crackdown	 on	 ICS	 by	 law	
enforcement	 agencies	 in	 the	 last	 ten	 years.	
JCD	is	reduced	to	less	than	10	per	cent	in	the	









increase	 in	 factional	 fighting	between	2001	
and	2006,	which	directly	 corresponds	with	
the	 Khaleda	 II	 period	 (2001-2006).	 BCL	
factional	 fighting	 was	 highly	 limited	 upto	
2008	when	both	BCL	violence	and	factional	
violence	 saw	 a	 clear	 increase,	 which	
corresponds	 with	 the	 Hasina	 II	 period.	
(2008-2013).	 Factional	 violence	 levels,	
however,	 dropped	 after	 2013,	 which	 can	
partly	 be	 explained	 by	 Mayor	 Liton’s	
surprising	 electoral	 defeat	 in	 2013	 partly	
due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 discipline	 and	 support	 by	
local	 party	 leaders	 and	 activists	 and	 his	
subsequent	attempts	to	discipline	and	unite	
the	party	behind	him.	 	 2018,	 however,	 saw	
somewhat	 of	 a	 resurgence	 of	 factional	 BCL	
violence.	
	
4.3.3 Student politics in Rajshahi 
BCL	 rule	 in	 Rajshahi	 is	 broadly	 divided	
between	two	power	centers.	One	is	city	BCL	
and	 the	 other	 one	 RU	 BCL.	 The	 city	 BCL	
envelops	 all	 college,	 ward	 and	 thana	 level	
committees,	while	the	BCL	RU	committee	has	
the	 same	 status	 as	 a	 district	 or	 city	




This	 becomes	 most	 evident	 during	 joint	
processions	 in	 the	 city	 when	 every	
committee	tries	to	mobilize	as	many	activists	
as	 possible	 and	 parades	 their	 respective	
manpower	in	front	of	the	AL	city	leaders.		In	
terms	of	manpower	the	city	BCL	is	superior	
to	 the	 RU	 BCL	 committee	 and	 is	 directly	
controlled	by	the	city	AL.	Several	Rajshahi	AL	
leaders	 have	 confirmed	 that	 for	 the	
functioning	of	the	party	machine,	especially	











On	 the	 other	 hand,	 RU	 BCL	 leaders	 are	
considered	 more	 elite.	 The	 president	 and	
general	 secretary	 can	 expect	 to	 join	 either	
the	central	BCL	or	pursue	another	promising	








an	unwritten	 rule	 results	 in	one	of	 the	 two	
top	positions	being	 filled	by	a	local	and	 the	
other	 by	 a	 non-local.	 In	 the	 last	 RU	 BCL	
student	council	in	2016,	however,	the	city	AL	
committee	convinced	central	BCL	leaders	to	
select	 two	 local	 leaders	 as	 president	 and	
general	 secretary	 who	 were	 directly	
patronized	by	Liton.	Like	in	other	cases,	for	a	








end,	given	his	 families	political	 legacy	he	 is	
the	 supreme	 leader	 of	 AL	 in	 Rajshahi.	
Current	 AL	 general	 secretary	 for	 Rajshahi	
Dablu	Sarker	attempted	to	challenge	Liton’s	
reign	 and	 supported	 his	 own	 candidates	
during	 the	 2016	 RU	 BCL	 council	 selection	
process,	but	his	efforts	were	unsuccessful,	as	
his	 strong	 support	 by	 local	 party	 activists	
and	 grassroots	 leaders	 was	 not	 enough	 to	
counter	 Liton’s	 strong	 central	 AL	 support	
and	 thus	 access	 to	party-state	 resources.	 It	
can	 be	 assumed	 that	 AL’s	 fairly	 unified	
political	 machine	 in	 Rajshahi	 is	 the	 main	
reason	for	the	relative	low	levels	of	factional	
violence	 and	 the	 strong	 organizational	
consolidation	of	BCL.		
4.3.3.1 BCL-ICS violence   
BCL	 domination	 has	 not	 always	 been	 the	
case.	 RU	was	 previously	 an	 ICS	 stronghold	


















“Non-locals have to 
perform twice as good 
to be selected as a 
leader (non-local BCL 
activist, RU).”  
 
“They [BCL] came and 
chased people away 
from the tea stalls and 
broke some benches 
and slapped and kicked 
some general students 
that were just sitting 
randomly there. They 
wanted to show their 
power and to 
intimidate, that is what 
they [BCL] do (general 












to	 resort	 to	 more	 covert	 activities	 and	
guerilla	 tactics.	 A	 signature	 attack	 was	 to	
ambush	 individual	senior	BCL	leaders,	beat	
them	 unconscious,	 cut	 their	 achilleas	
tendons	 and	 cut	 off	 their	 trigger	 fingers.	











leaders	 and	 has	 influenced	 the	 way	 BCL	
operates	 at	 RU.	 For	 several	 years,	 BCL	
leaders	 avoided	 moving	 around	 campus	 at	
night,	 and	 if	 they	 had	 to	 take	 the	 risk	 and	
travel	10	minutes	to	the	city	for	some	reason,	
it	was	common	to	use	one	of	the	ambulances	
of	 the	 RU	 medical	 clinic.	 Bodyguard	 style	




his	 men	 on	 the	 second	 motorcycle,	 which	
would	 follow	 closely	 behind	 the	 first	
motorcycle	manned	by	three	activists,	while	
the	third	and	last	motorcycle	(also	carrying	






Military	 tactics	 such	 as	 these	 have	 also	
permeated	the	language.	RU	has	received	the	
nickname	“mini-cantonment”,	referring	to	its	
almost	 insatiable	 source	 of	 violent	 party	
labor.	 Furthermore,	 two	 parts	 of	 campus,	
which	 have	 been	 the	 sites	 of	many	 clashes	
have	 been	 coined	 Afghanistan	 and	 Iraq	
referring	 to	 the	 wars	 taking	 place	 in	 these	
countries.	Main	criteria	for	being	selected	in	
the	 last	 2016	 RU	 BCL	 council	 was	 Liton’s	
patronage	 and	previous	 engagement	 in	 the	
fight	 against	 ICS.	 Some	 former	 BCL	 leaders	




has	 shifted	 their	 activities	 completely	
underground	 and	 avoided	 any	 open	
confrontation.	 According	 to	 some	

















university	 leadership	 at	 least	 seems	 alert.	
Frequently,	 students	 are	 beaten	 up	 and	










at	 RU	 are	 non-local,	 which	 makes	 it	 more	
difficult	to	identify	the	political	 identities	of	
general	 students	 or	 even	 their	 own	
members.	 This	 is	 one	 of	 the	 reasons	
intelligence	 agencies	 such	 as	 the	 Detective	
Branch	(DB)	or	even	the	Directorate	General	
of	Forces	Intelligence	(DGFI)	try	their	best	to	
gather	 information	 and	 prepare	 reports,	
especially	 for	 the	 selection	 of	 leadership	




4.3.3.2 Halls and careers   
At	 RU	 the	 student	 halls	 are	 also	 the	 main	
source	 of	 recruitment.	 Like	 at	 DU	 the	 hall	
committees	 are	 led	 by	 a	 president	 and	
general	 secretary	 and	 their	 rivalry	
sometimes	 results	 in	 factional	 violence.	
When	compared	to	DU,	however,	the	student	
halls	at	RU	do	not	have	ganarooms.	While	the	
halls	 can	 also	 not	 accommodate	 all	 the	
students	that	need	accommodation,	the	price	
to	 stay	 in	 private	 accommodations	 (a	 so-
“Now, because of my 
close relationship to the 
general secretary of BCL 
RU I’ve got a job with 
the police, they prefer 
to recruit us [BCL 
cadres] (BCL activist, 
RU).” 
 
“When a new student 
comes to a hall, boro 
bhai (senior brothers) 
pressure the fresher to 
make him join politics 
[…]. Activists 
sometimes use force 
and ask how you were 
able to get a room. To 
avoid this student 
come to seek political 
shelter. And after 
sometimes, they start 







much	more	 affordable	 than	 in	 Dhaka.	 Still,	
many	 first-	 and	 second-year	 students	 are	
pressured	 to	 join	 BCL	 activities	 to	 avoid	
harassment	 or	 extortion,	 especially	 those	
that	 are	 non-local,	 and	 come	 from	
impoverished	 rural	 areas	 and	 thus	 lack	
protection.	 After	 receiving	 the	 benefits	 –	
which	 can	 include	 tea,	 cigarettes,	 food,	




have	 good	 chances	 to	 pursue	 a	 political	
career	 in	 Rajshahi	 or	 at	 least	 use	 their	
political	 connections	 to	 engage	 in	 lucrative	
contracts	or	tenders,	if	they	have	maintained	
good	 relationships	 with	 city	 AL	 leaders.	
However,	 in	 the	 central	BCL	 committee	RU	
leaders	 have	 traditionally	 been	
underrepresented	 and	 not	 selected	 for	
higher	 positions.	 This	 has	 led	 to	 some	
disillusionment	 among	 senior	 RU	 BCL	
leaders	who	see	 themselves	as	being	at	 the	
forefront	 in	 the	 fight	 against	 ICS	 and	 thus	
believe	 they	 should	 be	 represented	 more	
prominently	in	the	central	committee.		A	vast	
majority	 of	 RU	 BCL	 committee	 members,	
however,	have	either	received	a	government	
job	within	 the	 university	 administration	 or	
as	 Superintendent	 of	 police	 after	 their	
student	life.		
	
4.3.3.3 Non-partisan student movements   
BCL	has	also	been	active	in	suppressing	non-




backed	 by	 some	 leftist	 organizations	
protesting	 a	 student	 fee	hike	were	brutally	
attacked	by	BCL	activists,	who	purportedly	
followed	 a	 direct	 order	 from	 the	 AL	
dominated	 university	 administration.	 BCL	
used	guns	to	shoot	into	the	crowd	as	well	as	
metal	 rods	 and	 bamboo	 sticks,	 injuring	
around	60	students.		
	
A	 more	 recent	 incident	 happened	 in	 the	
course	 of	 the	 Quota	 Reform	 Movement	 in	
2018.	 In	 what	 has	 become	 known	 as	 the	
“hammer	 incident”	 young	 BCL	 activists	
attacked	Quota	Reform	protesters	and	beat	
one	 of	 the	 conveners	 with	 bamboo	 sticks,	
metal	 rods	 and	 a	 hammer	 and	 left	 their	
victim	 barely	 conscious	 on	 the	 floor.	 The	
incident	 was	 captured	 on	 video	 and	
distributed	 by	 the	 media.	 The	 gruesome	
attack	sparked	a	countrywide	outcry,	but	the	
attackers	 have	 still	 not	 been	 brought	 to	
justice.	 According	 to	 our	 interviewees	 this	
was	 an	 overreaction	 by	 the	 young	activists	
who	were	ordered	to	prevent	the	movement	
from	entering	the	campus	but	not	to	resort	to	




this	 opportunity	 to	 gain	 attention	 by	 the	
party	 leadership	 with	 the	 hope	 of	 being	





with	 the	 hammer	 has	 reached	 a	 sort	 of	
celebrity	 status	 within	 the	 organization.	 It	






Khulna	 is	 the	 main	 city	 in	 Southwest	
Bangladesh	 and,	 with	 a	 population	 of	




home	 to	 three	 public	 universities—Khulna	
University,	Khulna	University	of	Engineering	




and	 Khulna	 Medical	 College.	 As	 such,	 like	
Rajshahi	it	has	a	large	student	population.	It	
is	 considered	 a	 business	 hub	 and	 has	 an	
Export	Processing	zone.	Many	local	student	




Khulna	 is	 less	 violent	 than	 the	other	major	
university	 towns.	 The	 absence	 of	 student	
politics	 in	 Khulna	 University	 plays	 an	
important	 role	 in	 this.	 (Party-)political	
student	organizations	have	been	banned	on	
campus	 since	 its	 official	 inauguration	 in	
1991.	The	program	for	establishing	a	Khulna	













on	 student	 politics	 in	 the	 university’s	
constitution.	As	 a	 result,	 student	politics	 in	
Khulna	is	not	dominated	by	the	universities,	
but	 rather	 by	 the	 colleges,	 that	 commonly	
also	have	halls.	Specifically,	 the	Azam	Khan	
Government	Commerce	College	 is	currently	
considered	 to	 take	 the	 lead	 in	 student	
politics.	 BL	 College	 and	 Government	 Majid	
Memorial	City	College	have	held	similar	titles	
in	 the	 recent	 past	 and	 are	 still	 political	
hotbeds.	 The	 absence	 of	 university	 student	




Interestingly,	 student	 leaders	 tend	to	strive	
to	 become	 businessmen	 rather	 than	 career	
politicians.	 This	 might	 provide	 them	 a	
different	outlook	on	the	use	of	violence	than	
their	 fellow	 student	 leaders	 in	 other	 cities	
who	want	to	enter	professional	politics.		
	
Figure	 15	 shows	 that	 apart	 from	 the	 mid	
1990s	 –	 when	 there	 were	 major	 national	
“In Dhaka, Chittagong 
and Rajshahi politics 
is University based. 
Because Khulna 
University is free of 
student politics, there 
are no leaders here 
who have the highest 
level of education. 
This is why Khulna is 
very calm. (female 











university	 cities.	 Interestingly,	 students	 of	
Khulna	 are	 largely	proud	of	 the	 absence	 of	





4.4.1 City politics in Khulna 
Khulna	has	been	firmly	under	BNP	rule.	This	
should	 not	 come	 as	 a	 surprise	 as	 BNP	 has	
been	 much	 more	 business	 oriented.	 	 BNP	
member	Sheikh	Tayebur	Rahman	led	the	city	
from	 1991	 to	 2007,	 after	 which	 he	 was	
barred	 from	 contesting	 the	 2008	 elections	
due	 to	 corruption	 charges.	 The	 2008	
elections	were	won	by	AL’s	Talukder	Abdul	
Khaleque	 who	 then	 lost	 to	 BNP’s	 Md.	
Moniruzzaman	 Moni	 in	 2013.	 Khaleque	
returned	 to	power	 in	 the	2018	Khulna	City	
Corporation	 elections,	 but	 many	
irregularities	 were	 cited. AL	 in	 Khulna	 is	
factionally	 divided	 with	 one	 faction	 siding	
with	mayor	Khaleque	and	the	other	with	the	
former	 MP	 of	 Khulna-2:	 Mizanur	 Rahman.	
Khaleque	 is	 the	 established	 politician,	 but	
Rahman	emerged	quickly	 in	2005	and	later	
became	MP.	The	factional	divide	between	the	
two	 is	 said	 to	 have	 caused	 the	 failure	 of	
Khaleque	to	renew	his	term	as	a	Mayor.	This	
in	 turn	 led	 to	 criticism	 from	 AL	 at	 the	
national	level,	and	Rahman	was	not	given	the	
nomination	 in	 2008.	 It	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	
how	this	will	affect	AL	factionalism. 
 
4.4.2 Data on student violence in Khulna 
While	 JCD	 was	 slightly	 more	 dominant	
during	 Rahman’s	 period	 of	 rule,	 levels	 of	
violence	 remained	 relatively	 limited,	 with	
JCD,	 BCL	 and	 ICS	 having	 fairly	 balanced	
shares	of	violence	(Figure	16).	This	changed	
when	Rahman	was	ousted	from	power,	with	
a	 notable	 increase	 in	 BCL-related	 violence,	
which	was	matched	 to	 some	extent	by	 ICS.		
The	 return	 to	 power	 of	 BNP	 in	 the	 city	 in	
2013	 reduced	 the	 levels	 of	 violence	
(disregarding	the	role	of	ICS	in	the	anti-war-
crimes	 tribunals).	 With	 current	 Mayor	
Khaleque’s	AL	rival	at	least	temporarily	out	
of	 the	 picture,	 there	 is	 a	 good	 chance	 that	
student	politics	could	remain	fairly	peaceful.		
	
The	 resurgence	 of	 BCL	 in	 Khulna	 in	 recent	
years	 is	 clearly	 reflected	 in	 the	 data	 (table	








and	 to	 a	 much	
lesser	 extent	
JCD	 maintain	 a	
presence.	 Given	 the	 more	 spatially	
fragmented	 nature	 of	 student	 politics	 in	
“While doing party 
politics, violence is a 
must […] no one is 
completely good in 
politics. Sometimes 
you have to jump in a 
violent scenario 
because there is 
nothing you can do 
about it (BCL activist, 




Khulna,	 ICS	 was	 able	 to	 remain	 present	 in	
B.L.	College,	even	to	this	day.	The	reason	for	
ICS’	 continued	 capacity	 is	 their	 strict	
organizational	 structure	 and	 the	 close	
control	they	keep	on	their	activists.	They	also	
continue	 to	 recruit	 among	 former	Madrasa	























Khulna	 as	 well	 (Table	 14)	 with	 very	 low	
incidents	during	the	Khaleda	I	and	Hasina	I	
governments,	 and	 none	 for	 JCD.	 The	 latter	
group,	 however,	 recorded	 higher	 figures	
under	the	last	Khaleda	Zia	government.	BCL	
remained	 faction-free	 under	 Khaleda	 II,	
however,	 there	 was	 a	 notable	 increase	





government,	 likely	 as	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	
contest	 between	 Khaleque	 and	 Mizanur	
Rahman.	The	Hasina	III	period	has	also	seen	
a	 rise	 in	 JCD	 factional	 violence	 as	 a	
percentage	 of	 all	 violence	 but	 representing	
only	very	low	absolute	numbers	of	incidents	
due	 to	 overall	 low	 levels	 of	 JCD	 violence.	
Respondents	suggested	that	it	was	in	fact	the	
increased	 factionalism	 within	 the	 JCD	 that	
made	concerted	action	nearly	impossible.	
	
4.4.3 Student politics in Khulna 
As	 in	 some	 of	 the	 other	 cities	 studied,	 hall	
politics	 are	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 student	
politics	 in	 Khulna.	 This	 takes	 a	 distinctly	
different	nature	in	universities	and	colleges	
in	Khulna,	however,	perhaps	because	as	one	
college	 principal	 said,	 colleges	 do	 not	 get	
funding	to	look	after	student	halls.	To	fill	the	
gap,	politicians	supply	the	necessary	funding	




presence	 and	 ICS	 maintains	 a	 limited	
presence).	 This	 opposition	 presence	 is	
probably	 only	 possible,	 as	 the	 foremost	






























pursuing	 their	 political	 careers.	 College	




Factionalism	 among	 city	 bosses	 is	
considered	to	be	the	main	driver	of	party	in-
fighting	 among	 students.	 Mizanur	 Rahman,	
the	 more	 popular	 leader	 among	 student	
activists,	 is	considered	to	be	less	blunt,	and	
more	 “cultured”	 than	 Khaleque.	 He	 also	
allows	his	student	activists	to	derive	income	
from	 government	 contracts	 and	 other	




Rahman’s	 popularity	with	 student	 activists	
could	 also	 be	 explained	 by	 his	 former	
national	appeal	as	an	MP.	In	contrast	to	other	
places,	in	Khulna	non-local	students	tend	to	
play	 more	 significant	 roles,	 with	 local	
students	 instead	 relying	 on	 their	 business	
family	 relations.	 This	 has	 not	 always	 been	
the	case	as	interviews	indicate	that	the	local	




Students	 from	 e.g.	 Sathkhira	 are	 said	 to	
attend	 Azam	 Khan	 Government	 Commerce	









“Most senior leaders 
within the committee 
are non-local. So, 
being local does not 
count, nor does it 




“City politicians have 
a hundred percent 
influence in student 
politics. This is 
because they use 
student leaders to 
work for them (JCD 






violence.	While	 they	 are	 recruited	 into	 the	
city	politicians	networks	 for	shelter,	and	 to	
ensure	 positions,	 they	 at	 the	 same	 time	
remain	 somewhat	 removed	 from	 local	
politics	 in	 mapping	 out	 their	 own	 future,	
both	 in	 terms	 of	 jobs	 and	 future	 political	
party	 careers.	 For	 them	 it	 is	 often	 more	
important	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 active—which	 of	
course	 includes	 violence	 if	 necessary—by	
their	political	patrons	in	their	home	districts,	




be	 more	 dependent	 on	 the	 goodwill	 of	





Sylhet	 city	 is	 located	on	 the	 Surma	 river	 in	
Eastern	 Bangladesh	 and	 is	 the	
administrative	 capital	 of	 the	 district,	
bordering	Northeast	India.	The	municipality	








homeland	 to	 this	 day.	 These	 connections	
                                               
19 Gardner,	 K.	 (1995)	Global	Migrants,	 Local	Lives:	Travel	and	Transformation	 in	 Rural	Bangladesh.	Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press. 




The	 Sylhet	metropolitan	 area	 is	 one	 of	 the	
main	 business	 centers	 in	 Bangladesh.	 The	
region	 is	 a	 major	 recipient	 of	 annual	
remittances	 from	 the	 diaspora	 in	 the	 UK,	
which	 is	a	main	driver	of	economic	growth	
and	 development.	 Furthermore,	 the	
country’s	principal	reserves	of	gas	and	crude	
oil,	as	well	as	the	largest	tea	plantations,	are	

















politics	 in	 the	 UK.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 city	 is	




politicians need to 
show muscle power, 
they go to city 
politicians. Every 
group from the 
campus takes shelter 








Shajahal	 University	 of	 Science	 and	
Technology	(SUST),	established	in	1986,	was	
the	 first	 of	 eight	 science	 and	 technology	
universities	 in	 the	 country	 and,	 with	more	
than	10,000	students,	is	the	largest	institute	
of	 higher	 educational	 in	 the	 city.	 Its	
comparably	strong	research	focus	had	led	to	




is	 located	 in	 Kumargaon,	 about	 six	
kilometers	away	from	the	city	center.	
 
4.5.1 City politics in Sylhet 	
Sylhet	saw	a	long	period	of	rule	by	AL,	with	
BNP	 having	 less	 of	 an	 impact	 in	municipal	
and	city	corporation	elections	until	the	last	5	
years.	From	1995,	AL’s	Badar	Uddin	Ahmed	
Kamran	 was	 mayor,	 first	 of	 Sylhet	
Municipality	 and	 later	 of	 Sylhet	 City	
Corporation.	 In	 2013	 he	 was	 defeated	 by	
BNP’s	 Ariful	 Haque	 Choudhury,	 who	 won	
again	in	2018.	
	
The	 2018	 BNP	 victory	 was	 especially	
remarkable,	as	most	other	city	corporations	
went	 to	 AL	 this	 year	 due	 to	 widespread	
election	 engineering.20	 In	 Sylhet,	 however,	
BNP	candidate	Ariful	Haque	Choudhury	took	
advantage	of	 the	deep	 fragmentation	of	AL	
into	 at	 least	 six	 different	 factions.	 He	 was	
able	 to	 mobilize	 enough	 manpower	 to	
                                               
20 See e.g. Human Rights Watch (2019) ‘Bangladesh election abuses need independent probe’. Available online 
at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/02/bangladesh-election-abuses-need-independent-probe. 
protect	 enough	 polling	 booths	 from	 being	
captured	 and	 manipulated	 by	 AL	 and	 BCL	
activists.	And	AL	and	BCL	were	not	 able	 to	
mobilize	 enough	 manpower,	 as	 some	
factions	decided	not	to	support	Badar	Uddin	
Ahmed	Kamran,	or	even	supported	the	BNP	
candidate	 Choudhury,	 based	 on	 personal	
friendship	relations.					
	
4.5.2 Data on student violence in Sylhet 
Sylhet	 is	 not	 the	 most	 violent	 city.	 At	 the	
same	 time,	 and	with	 the	 clear	 exception	 of	
2005-2006	 and	 the	 2012-2015	 period,	
student	 violence	 has	 been	 by	 far	 the	most	
















BCL	 for	 the	 first	 time	 since	 1991	 clearly	
dominated	JCD.	The	return	of	mayoral	power	
to	 the	BNP	did	not	really	alter	 this.	 ICS	has	
“During 2013-14 the 
SUST campus was 
totally unstable. 
Political riots were 
the daily occurrence. 
We experienced a lot 
of political clashes 
especially between 
ICS and BCL.  ICS 
resided in the halls 
until 2012. But then, 
they were washed 
out from the halls 
after a large riot 





been	 on	 par	with	 BCL	 for	many	 years	 and	
saw	 a	 clear	 increase	 in	 violence	 between	
2012	and	2014.		
	
Sylhet	 thus	 forms	 an	 interesting	 case	 for	
student	violence.	It	is	a	city	in	which	JCD	has	
clearly	dominated	when	it	comes	to	the	use	














from	 2008	 to	 2014	 saw	 major	 violence	
between	JCD,	ICS	and	BCL	in	which	BCL	made	
every	 effort	 to	 dislodge	 JCD	 and	 ICS	 from	






and	 ICS	 violence	 as	 well,	 notwithstanding	
their	 relative	demise	 in	 the	 last	 four	 years.	
JCD	 also	 clearly	 is	 much	 more	 engaged	 in	
violence	than	its	parent	party.	
	
Also	 interesting	 compared	 to	 the	 all	
Bangladesh	figures	are	the	high	percentages	
of	lethal	casualties	of	student	violence,	with	
more	 than	 30	 per	 cent	 of	 lethal	 casualties	
caused	by	BCL	violence,	with	JCD	at	around	








see	 the	 trend	that	 the	student	group	of	 the	
party	in	power	is	more	engaged	in	factional	
violence	 reflected	 also	 in	 Sylhet.	 Certainly,	





BNP	 rule	 nationally.	 While	 the	 Hasina	 II	
government	still	saw	relatively	high	levels	of	
JCD	 violence,	 this	 was	 much	 less	 the	 case	
during	Hasina	III.	This	is	probably	the	result	
of	both	 the	strengthening	of	AL/BCL	which	
were	 able	 to	 clearly	 dominate	 JCD	 and	 the	
ability	 of	 BNP	 mayor	 Ariful	 to	 control	
violence.  
“Central BCL has not 
organized a council 
since 2013, because of 
too many factions in 
the city and on 
campus. I asked them 
to organize a council, 
but they weren’t 
interested. They 
wanted to wait until 
AL has sorted out their 
factionalism in the city 




















4.5.3 Student politics at SUST 
ICS	primarily	dominated	student	politics	on	
campus	during	the	Khaleda	II	period	(2001-
2006).	 JCD	 never	 had	 a	 strong	 presence	 at	
SUST	 but	 instead	 was	 more	 active	 at	 the	
colleges	in	the	city.		As	in	other	places	in	this	
report,	 BCL	 struggled	 to	 assert	 their	
dominance	 on	 campus	 in	 the	 first	 years	 of	







in	 the	 city.	 As	 a	 result,	 SUST	 BCL	 has	 also	
fragmented	 into	 six	 to	 eight	 factions,	
competing	 over	 the	 influence	 on	 campus,	
specifically	seats	in	halls.	This	factionalism	is	
the	core	reason	for	intra-party	violence	and	




fear	 of	 factional	 violence.	 Instead,	 the	 halls	
are	 internally	 divided	 into	 the	 various	
factions.	 The	 last	 SUST	 BCL	 council	 (i.e.	
committee	 [s]election)	 took	 place	 in	 2013,	
which	means	that	the	current	president	and	












from	 Habiganj	 and	 Gazipur.	 As	 in	 other	
places,	 the	 role	 of	 SUST	 student	 politics	 is	
different	than	city	student	politics.	While	city	
student	politics	 is	dominated	by	 locals	who	
maintain	 patronage	 relations	 designed	 to	
last	 much	 longer,	 many	 SUST	 student	
activists	and	leaders	are	non-local	and	their	




and	 general	 secretary	 have	 only	 partial	
control	over	some	factions.	Central	BCL	has	
not	 called	 for	 a	 council	 as	 there	 is	 no	
dominant	faction	that	would	be	able	to	unite	
the	committee,	and	a	council	would	likely	be	
“I lived in the student 
hall for a few days. 
But I observed that 
those who are living 
in the hall must go to 
political functions. 
That is why I left the 
























wanted	 to	 enter	 the	 SUST	 campus	with	his	
supporters	and	unite	the	factions	under	the	
leadership	of	his	faction.	However,	before	he	
could	 enter,	 the	 vice	 chancellor	 of	 the	
University	 intervened,	 denying	 the	mayor’s	
request	and	banning	him	from	campus.		
	






















their	 home	 area,	 access	 to	 resources	 or	 a	
future	 career	 in	politics.	 Senior	 leaders	 are	
also	 frustrated,	 as	 some	 of	 them	 are	 not	
students	anymore	and	want	to	move	on.		
	
At	 SUST,	 female	 involvement	 in	 student	
politics	 has	 not	 been	 realized.	 Currently	
there	 is	 only	 one	 female	 BCL	 leader	 on	




Bogra	 town	 is	 located	 in	 the	 north	 of	 the	
Rajshahi	 division	 and	 is	 the	 administrative	
capital	 of	 the	 district.	 Bogra	 town	 has	 a	




the	 northern	 region,	 connecting	 it	 to	 the	
peripheral	Rangpur	Division.		
	
“Violence is always 
very negative. It 
hampers the regular 
activities on campus. 
But I was involved 
many times in 
violence on campus. 
There is a saying: 
“Survival of the 
fittest”. So, it is 
important to deal 
with the violent 
activities otherwise 
you cannot be a 
leader (BCL activist, 
SUST).” 
“Not engaging in 
power politics is very 
difficult in this 
political situation. I 
do not like it, but I 
have to if I want to 
preserve and do good 





Historically	 and	 politically	 Bogra	 plays	 a	
prominent	role.	It	was	not	only	the	site	of	the	
Battle	of	Bogra	during	the	Liberation	War	of	
1971	 but	 is	 also	 the	 hometown	 of	 the	
founding	father	of	BNP	and	former	military	
dictator	 Ziaur	 Rahman	 as	 well	 as	 Khaleda	
Zia’s	home	constituency.	Since	the	formation	
of	BNP	in	the	second	half	of	the	1970s,	Bogra	
had	 been	 a	 BNP	 stronghold.	 The	 city	 has	
profited	 from	 its	 prominent	 politicians,	
compared	 with	 Rajshahi,	 especially	 during	
BNP	 rule.	 City	 infrastructure	 is	 well	
developed,	 and	 business	 is	 flourishing.	 The	
city	 is	 famous	 for	 red	 chili	 production,	
banking	and	a	growing	IT	sector.		
	
The	 city,	 however,	 has	no	public	university	
and	only	a	few	colleges.	The	most	politically	
active	colleges	are	Government	Azizul	Haque	
College	 (AHC)	 established	 in	 1939,	 Shah	
Sultan	 College	 (SSC)	 (1968)	 and	 Shaheed	
Ziaur	Rahman	Medical	College	(1992).	AHC,	
which	is	a	public	college	under	the	National	
University	 of	 Bangladesh,	 figures	
prominently	 in	 Bogra’s	 political	 landscape	
with	its	roughly	48,000	students.		
	
4.6.1 City politics in Bogra town 
Bogra	is	considered	one	of	the	strongholds	of	
BNP.	 Long-term	 BNP	 mayor	 A.K.M	
Mahabubur	 Rahman	 (2005-present)	
continues	 to	 run	 the	 municipality	 after	
winning	 his	 reelection	 in	 2015	 by	 bagging	
double	 the	 number	 of	 votes	 than	 his	 AL	
contender.	 Bogra	 municipality	 is	 part	 of	
Bogra	 6,	 which	 used	 to	 be	 Khaleda	 Zia’s	
constituency.	 In	 the	 2018	 elections	 Mirza	
Fakhrul	 Islam	 Alamgir,	 the	 current	 central	
secretary	 general	 of	 BNP,	 won	 the	
constituency.	 He	 refused	 to	 take	 the	 oath,	
however.	 It	 was	 one	 out	 of	 only	 four	
constituencies	BNP	was	able	 to	win.	 	 In	 the	
following	by-elections	BNP	candidate	Golam	
Mohammad	Siraj	won	and	 took	 the	oath	 to	
become	MP.		
	
There	 are	 multiple	 BNP	 factions	 in	 Bogra.	
Recently,	however,	the	central	committee	of	
BNP	 announced	 a	 new	 district	 BNP	
committee	 where	 they	 replaced	 previous	
senior	leaders	with	new	ones,	as	the	central	
committee	 deemed	 the	 followers	 of	 the	






political	 cases	 filed	 against	 them.	 The	
recently	elected	MP	Golam	Mohammad	Siraj	








Joint	 Secretary,	 Monjurul	 Alam	 Mohon.	
These	two	men	used	to	control	BCL	as	well	as	
all	other	AL	party	wings	and	were	locked	in	a	




Mohon	 and	was	 commonly	 considered	 the	
father	 of	 AL	 in	 Bogra.	 Mohon	 started	 as	 a	




into	 these	 two	 factions.	 Therefore,	
competition	and	rivalry	are	fierce,	which	has	




Mumtaz	 Uddin	 died	 earlier	 this	 year.	 His	
death	has	created	a	political	vacuum,	which	
various	 senior	 leaders	 are	 competing	 over.	
Currently	 the	 situation	 is	 convoluted,	 and	
Mumtaz	Uddin	factions	seems	fragmented	as	
his	 followers	 look	 for	different	 leaders	and	
patronage	networks.						
 
4.6.2 Data on student violence in Bogra 
Looking	at	levels	of	violence,	BNP	has	been	in	
a	 prominent	 position	 in	 the	 last	 ten	 years,	
notwithstanding	AL	rule	at	the	center	(Table	
17).	Meanwhile,	JCD	has	become	a	marginal	
player.	 One	 possible	 explanation	 is	 that	
student	 activists	 continue	 to	 participate	 in	
events	organized	by	their	mother	party,	but	
do	 not	 operate	 independently	 as	 JCD.	 BCL	
records	much	lower	shares	of	violence	than	
in	most	other	places	discussed	here,	as	it	 is	
only	 involved	 in	 around	 14	 per	 cent	 of	
incidents.	 ICS	 has	 also	 become	 a	 marginal	
player,	 with	 almost	 all	 their	 violent	 events	
restricted	to	2013	(Figure	20).		
	
It	 is	 hard	 to	 distinguish	 clear-cut	 trends	 in	







representative	 of	 a	 college,	 rather	 than	 a	
university	 town,	 where	 party-politics	
supersedes	 student	 politics	 and	 where	
student	 activists	 mostly	 participate	 in	
activities	under	a	party-political	banner	due	
to	 their	 junior	status	and	limited	individual	
political	 ambitions	 (see	 also	 the	 role	 of	




This	 might	 in	 fact	 explain	 the	 relative	
strength	 of	 BCL,	 as	 given	 the	 relative	
weakness	 of	 AL	 in	 Bogra,	 BCL	 can	 often	
operate	 independently	 from	 their	 mother	
party.	
	
Overall,	 student	 violence	 is	 much	 lower	 in	
absolute	 numbers	 than	 in	 the	 cases	 above,	
and	this	is,	of	course,	because	Bogra	has	no	
university	 and	 is	 a	 much	 smaller	
municipality	 and	 not	 a	 city	 corporation	
(Figure	19).	Over	the	full	1991-2018	period,	
the	 different	 student	 organizations	 have	
been	 fairly	 balanced,	 although	 BCL,	 rather	
surprisingly	 given	 the	 BNP	 stronghold,	
registers	an	important	presence.	The	impact	
“They [city leaders] 
have 100 percent 
influence. They 
decide and operate 
everything. We are 
like their hands and 






clear	 as	 BCL	 overpowers	 both	 JCD	 and	 ICS	



















than	 in	 most	 other	 places	 (Table	 18).	
Factional	violence	accounts	 for	a	maximum	
of	 17	 per	 cent	 of	 violence	 in	 which	 JCD	
participated,	 under	 the	 Khaleda	 I	
government.	BCL	reached	its	highest	share	of	
factional	 violence	 under	 the	 Hasina	 III	
government,	at	around	23	per	cent.		
	
4.6.3 Student politics in Bogra  
The	 Azizul	 Haque	 College	 is	 the	 leading	
educational	 institution	 and	 the	 heart	 of	
student	 politics	 in	 Bogra.	 Despite	 BNP’s	
strength	in	the	city,	BCL	has	been	able	to	take	
control	 over	 the	 campus.	 AHC	 plays	 an	
important	role	in	Bogra’s	student	politics,	as	
almost	 all	 BCL	 senior	 leaders	 are	 selected	
from	this	college.	The	student	halls	of	AHC,	
however,	 remain	closed	after	a	major	clash	
between	 BCL	 and	 ICS	 in	 2008.	 	 Still,	 AHC	
students	 are	 considered	 potential	 future	
leaders	by	local	city	leaders,	as	their	students	











on	 the	 students	 from	 AHC	 and	 with	 the	
student	 halls	 closed	 down	 student	 politics	
has	 expanded	 to	 private	 messes	 (hostels)	





from	 SSC.	 This	 is	 rather	 rare	 as	 previous	
leadership	came	only	from	AHC.	SSC	activists	
and	 leaders	 primarily	 serve	 as	 “muscle”	 to	
control	the	surrounding	areas	of	the	campus,	




“I don’t have 
intentions of 
continuing politics. I’ll 
focus on jobs. I 
believe this BCL 
background will be 



























mobilization	 capacity	 of	 the	 party,	 “giving	
protocol”	 to	 the	 leaders	 and	 filling	 up	 an	
otherwise	 political	 void	 in	 the	 medical	
college.	 However,	 others	 mentioned	 the	
various	sources	of	money	for	activists	to	tap	
into,	 such	 as	 the	 medical	 college’s	 food	
service.	 Another	 interviewee	 complained	
about	the	delayed	district	BCL	council	for	the	
formation	of	a	new	committee,	as	they	hoped	





days,	 having	 BCL	 in	 your	 CV	 would	 prove	
useful	 for	 the	 future	 career	 in	 the	medical	
field.		
	
As	 mentioned	 above,	 all	 committees	 were	
until	 recently	 divided	 into	 the	 two	 main	



















patronage	 of	 Mumtaz	 Uddin,	 is	 currently	 a	
strong	candidate	for	the	district	BCL	general	
“Lobbying absolutely 
plays a huge role 
these days. Lobbying 
actually gets the job 
done more than 
anything else. You got 
to be their best pet. 
Nothing happens 
without lobbying. I 
would put lobbying 
and hard work in a 70-
30% ratio (BCL 
activist, AHC).” 
“Violence maybe bad […] 
but sometimes we are left 
with this as the only option. 
Previously there was shibir 
and JCD, […] but now there 
are factions within us. Like 
there was a clash between 
the president and secretary 
group. A few shots were 
fired. Nowadays it is more 
about taking control of an 
area, such as this 
campus.  We were chasing 
each other. We also had 
sticks made of tree 
branches with us. We got 
involved because we had to 
be there for our leader. He 
needed us and we need 




secretary	 position	 in	 the	 soon	 to	 be	 held	
council,	 but	 so	 is	 another	 leader	 from	 the	
same	 group.	 The	 general	 secretary	 is	 now	
seeking	 support	 of	 the	 district	 AL	
Organizational	 Secretary,	 while	 his	
contender	is	supported	by	a	former	two-time	
AHC	 general	 secretary	 who	 belongs	 to	
another	faction	that	is	related	to,	but	in	the	
process	 of	 splitting	 from,	 the	 AL	
organizational	 secretary’s	 faction.	 The	 BCL	
council	 is	a	good	opportunity	 for	ambitious	
AL	leaders	to	shift	the	distribution	of	power	
























to	 speak	 with	 researchers,	 as	 they	 are	
worried	 about	 being	 spied	 on	 by	 the	
government.		
	
The	 current	 situation	 of	 ICS	 in	 Bogra	 is	








us	 by	 both	 ICS	
and	 BCL	
activists	 that	 ICS	 activists	 are	 indeed	 still	
residing	 in	 student	 halls	 of	 the	 medical	
college	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Shah	 Sultan	 College	
(SSC).	 We	 also	 heard	 that	 BCL	 leaders	 in	
collusion	 with	 local	 AL	 leaders,	 take	 hefty	
sums	 of	 money	 (up	 to	 1	 lakh	 BDT)	 in	
exchange	 for	 a	 seat	 in	 the	 hall	 and	
confidentiality	about	their	political	identity.	
ICS	 activists	 further	 confirmed	 that	 their	
organizational	 structure	 was	 still	 in	 place	
and	that	they	still	participate	in	their	regular	





Bogra	 at	 the	 time	 this	 research	 was	
conducted	was	shaped	by	political	upheaval	
in	both	AL	and	BNP.	The	upcoming	councils,	
especially	 on	 the	 AL/BCL	 side,	 have	drawn	
attention	 to	 the	political	 fragmentation	 just	
“Politics. I want to die 
doing it. It is the only 
goal of my life. I don’t 
have any other plans. 
I just want to be on 
the field, on the 
streets. There is 
nothing more thrilling 




becomes crucial. No 
matter how much we 
try to avoid it, it 
always comes down 
to it sometimes. If we 
are to hold our 
ground and make our 
presence known, we 
must be violent 
sometimes. There are 
many groups among 
us. Lack of opposition 
leads to these sorts of 
problems. As a result, 
we ended up with 





under	 the	 surface.	 In	 this	 context	 leaders	
have	 been	 careful	 to	 keep	 a	 clean	 image	
before	the	council	and	thus	largely	refrained	
from	 public	 displays	 of	 violence	 to	 not	
jeopardize	 their	 chances	 to	 be	 awarded	 a	
lucrative	position.		
	
Another	 interesting	 observation	 that	 is	 not	
necessarily	 unique	 to	 Bogra,	 is	 the	 multi-
layered	 relationship	 between	 BCL	 and	 JCD	







be	 a	 clear-cut	 separation	 between	 their	








strong	 influence	 of	 non-local	 students	 in	
senior	 BCL	 leadership	 positions	 (see	 also	
Khulna).	 Both	 the	 current	 president	 and	
general	secretary	of	the	district	BCL	are	not	
from	 Bogra.	 This	 is	 also	 true	 for	 the	 BCL	
leadership	 of	 AHC,	 and	 one	 reason	 for	 the	




especially	 in	 comparison	 to	 other	 cases	 in	
this	 report.	 This	 might	 be	 due	 to	 the	
longstanding	BNP	domination	of	Bogra	town	
itself,	 which	 allowed	 for	 limited	 scope	 for	















could	 be	 that	 for	 city	AL	 leaders,	 non-local	
students	might	be	easier	to	control,	as	 they	




Islamic	 University,	 Bangladesh,	 better	
known	 as	 Islamic	 University	 Kushtia,	 is	
located	on	 the	border	between	 the	Kushtia	
and	 Jhenaidah	 districts	 in	 Southwest	
Bangladesh.	As	compared	to	the	other	cases	
in	the	report,	this	is	a	rural	university.	It	was	
originally	 funded	 by	 the	 Organization	 of	
Islamic	 Cooperation	 and	 founded	 in	 1979,	
although	it	only	started	operating	in	1986.	It	
was	 originally	 part	 of	 Ziaur	 Rahman’s	
foregrounding	 of	 an	 Islamic	 Bangladesh	
“Students from 
different parts of the 
country come here. 
So, there is a huge 
variety of people. I 
am not a local. I am 
having no trouble 
doing politics. There 
are all sorts of people 
from so many cities. I 
don’t think being a 
local or non-local 









studies,	 social	 sciences	 and	 humanities,	 its	
departments	have	continued	to	grow,	and	it	
now	 is	 a	 comprehensive	 university.	
Currently	 around	 15,500	 students	 are	
enrolled	 at	 Islamic	 University.	 Initially,	 the	
University	 specifically	 wanted	 to	 provide	
higher	education	for	madrassa	students,	with	




4.7.1 Local politics in Kushtia and 
Jhenaidah 
The	 decision	 to	 establish	 the	 University	 on	
the	border	between	Kushtia	 (Kushtia	Sadar	
Upazila)	 and	 Jhenaidah	 (Shailkupa	Upazila)	
district	 was	 a	 compromise	 to	 placate	 rival	
factions	in	Kushtia	and	Jhenaidah,	both	vying	
for	 the	 University.	 This	 factional	 division	
continues	 to	 impact	 on	 the	 university	
student	politics	to	date.	
	
Factionalism	 within	 BCL	 and	 JCD	 is	
organized	according	to	the	division	between	
the	two	districts,	although	Kushtia	has	been	
the	 most	 dominant.	 However,	 Kushtia	 and	
Jhenaidah	 politicians	 would	 traditionally	
cooperate	 to	 divide	 the	 top	 positions	 to	
students	 from	 the	 two	 districts.	 Different	
respondents	 described	 this	 as	 a	 syndicate	
that	ensured	control	over	student	politics	by	
the	 two	district	AL	 leaderships.	Some	see	a	
weakening	of	 this	syndicate,	because	 in	 the	
present	 university	 committee	 no	 one	 from	
Jhenaidah	 is	 represented	 in	 top	 leadership.	
The	 importance	 of	 local	 party-political	
control	is	also	exemplified	by	the	role	of	the	
local	AL	MP.	He	was	originally	elected	from	a	
constituency	 in	 Jhenaidah,	 but	 later	 shifted	
to	 Kushtia,	 changing	 the	 balance	 of	 power	
between	the	two	main	factions.	However,	 it	
is	important	to	note	that	ICS,	a	key	player	in	
Islamic	 University	 was	 not	 plagued	 by	
factionalism	of	this	type.		
	
The	 importance	of	 the	 two	district	 factions	
also	 means	 that	 being	 local	 is	 highly	









a	 role	 in	 the	








“[A] syndicate has 
been working here to 
ensure that non-
locals shouldn’t be 
leaders. This 
syndicate has strong 
relationship with 






4.7.2 Student politics: The dominance of 
ICS and the rise of BCL 
Respondents	 clearly	 indicated	 that	 ICS	 has	
dominated	 student	 politics	 for	most	 of	 the	
university’s	 lifespan.	 They	 controlled	 the	
halls	 and	 the	 campus.	 In	 early	 years,	
competition	 existed	 between	 ICS	 and	 JCD,	


















population	 were	 not	 only	 attracted	 by	 the	
quality	of	education,	but	also	by	the	Islamic	
nature	 of	 the	 university.	 Ideologically,	 ICS	
thus	found	natural	allies	in	the	student	body.		
	
The	 violence	 data	 (see	 figure	 22)	 clearly	
shows	this	initial	struggle	between	JCD	and	




tried	 to	 establish	 themselves	 and	 violent	
clashes	 took	 place,	mostly	with	 ICS.	 As	 the	
quote	 indicates,	 dead	 body	 politics	 formed	
an	 integral	 part	 of	 this	 campaign.	 A	 fairly	
vicious	campaign	took	place	as	BCL	failed	to	
establish	 itself	 as	 a	 force	on	 campus.	 It	 did	
not	 help	 that	 surrounding	 areas	 had	 great	
support	for	the	Islamists.		
	
Interestingly,	 the	 2001-2006	 period,	
dominated	by	BNP	at	the	national	level,	saw	
a	 concerted	 effort	 to	 oust	 ICS.	 This	
manifested	itself	in	a	coalition	between	BCL	
and	a	number	of	leftist	student	groups,	and	
according	 to	 some	 of	 our	 respondents	 JCD	
also	 participated.	 However,	 this	 coalition	









“Corpses were left 
hanging at the main 
gate of the campus. It 
is thought to be the 
doing of local 
miscreants, but ICS 
used the incident 
later on while 




















and	 invigorated	 by	 the	 2013	 War	 Crimes	
Tribunals,	 BCL	 started	 a	 new	 campaign	 to	
oust	ICS	from	campus.			
	
From	 2009-2014	 a	 violent	 campaign	 was	
waged	 to	 eliminate	 ICS.	Respondents	argue	
that	it	was	not	only	the	support	of	AL	at	the	
national	level,	which	made	this	possible,	but	
also	 a	 tightening	 of	 BCL’s	 internal	
organization.	This	period	saw	a	return	to	the	
higher	levels	of	violence	of	the	early	to	mid	
1990s.	 With	 opposition	 MPs	 out	 of	 the	
picture,	certainly	after	2014,	BCL	seemed	to	
gain	 some	 momentum.	 ICS	 was	 no	 longer	
able	 to	 organize	 political	 programs	 and	
meetings	 on	 campus,	 although	 our	 sources	
indicate	 as	 recently	 as	 2017	 ICS	 still	
maintained	 control	 over	 a	 majority	 of	 the	
student	 halls.	 After	 one	 particularly	 large	
clash	 (not	 in	 our	 data),	 ICS	 vacated	 the	
student	halls	overnight,	a	move,	which	left	a	




The	 data	 show	 that	 ICS	 did	 not	 violently	
contest	 the	 BCL	 take-over.	 Today,	 neither	
JCD	nor	 ICS	 is	able	 to	be	active	on	campus.	
This	 could	 be	 considered	 a	 watershed	
moment	in	Islamic	University’s	history	given	
not	 only	 the	 long	 history	 of	 ICS	 control	 on	
campus,	 but	 also	 the	 support	 for	 political	
Islam	in	the	area.	It	is	surprising	that	the	AL	
and	BCL,	given	their	support	for	secularism	
(despite	 recent	 support	 for	 some	 Islamist	
organizations)	could	establish	themselves	in	
Islamic	University.	As	our	data	show,	this	has	
been	 done	 by	 an	 extensive	 deployment	 of	
force.	
	
As	 can	be	 read	 from	 table	19,	 this	was	not	
simply	done	by	BCL.	In	contrast	to	our	other	
cases	 BCL	 is	 not	 most	 active	 in	 violence.	
Rather,	it	is	AL	itself	which	is	dominant.		ICS	
and	JCD	have	been	notably	less	violent	than	
BCL	 and	 this	 reflects	 their	 growing	
marginalization	in	recent	years.	What	is	also	

















as	 they	 saw	 an	 opportunistic	 group	 of	
(former	 opposition)	 cadres	 entering	 the	
party.	
 	
“I think politics is a 
type of education 
which you have to get 
from your family. 




politicians who only 
start their political life 












4.7.3 Seat politics and factionalism 
As	in	most	other	universities	seat	politics	in	
the	 halls	 is	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 student	
politics.	 This	 is	 even	 more	 important	 in	 a	
University	 like	 Islamic	 University,	 which	 is	
not	located	in	a	city	but	is	more	remote.		ICS’	
political	 strategy	 and	 cadre	 based	 political	
organization	has	been	rooted	in	hall	control.	
One	importance	difference	with	other	cases	
should	 however	 be	 noted:	 while	 halls	 are	
often	 factionally	 divided	 and/or	 halls	 form	







the	 take-over	 of	 the	 student	 halls	 by	 BCL.	
They	 claim	 that	 “illegal	 seats”,	 those	
occupied	by	political	students,	now	form	the	
majority.	 BCL	 uses	 the	 same	 techniques	 as	
they	do	in	DU,	where	first-	and	second-year	
students	are	enrolled	in	political	programs	of	
all	 kinds	 and	 are	 incentivized	 or	 forced	 to	
participate.		The	situation	is	better	in	female	
halls,	 although	 being	 politically	 active	 in	
women’s	halls	is	also	not	without	its	benefits.	
Moreover,	 the	 Khustia-Jhenaidah	
factionalism	 has	 at	 least	partially	 impacted	
on	hall	organization.	
	
With	 BCL	 now	 in	 control,	 regional	
factionalism	might	increase	in	the	next	years,	
although	 the	 share	 of	 factional	 violence	 in	
Kushtia-Jhenaidah	is	and	has	been	relatively	











out	 of	 the	 process	 of	 University	 BCL	
Committee	 formation.	Very	recently,	 in	 July	
2019,	a	new	BCL	committee	was	announced,	
but	 factional	 struggles	 immediately	 broke	
out	not	only	with	those	who	did	not	get	posts	
in	the	committee	(certainly	Jhenaidah	seems	
to	 have	 been	 ignored),	 but	 also	 with	
members	 of	 the	 previous	 committee,	 who	
wanted	 to	 maintain	 their	 power.	 Some	
respondents	 also	 indicated	 that	 university	
teachers	 are	 implicated	 in	 the	 factional	





























This	 report	 has	 tried	 to	 provide	 in-depth	
understanding	 of	 how	 student	 politics	
functions	 across	 Bangladesh.	 We	 have	
looked	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 student	 politics	 in	
Bangladesh:	 Dhaka,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 major	
urban	 centers	 of	 Chittagong,	 Rajshahi,	
Khulna	 and	 Sylhet,	 and	 the	 rural	 areas	 of	
Kushtia	and	Bogra.	
	
Understanding	 regional	 variation	 and	
looking	 beyond	 Dhaka	 has	 proven	 key	 to	
understanding	variations	of	student	violence	
in	 the	 country.	 DU	 remains	 a	 special	 case.		
While	 DU	 student	 politics	 centers	 around	
national	politics,	in	the	regional	centers,	local	




Local	 patterns	 of	 violence	 are	 also	 often	
related	 to	 intra-party	 factional	 struggles	 at	
the	 local	 level	 and	 understanding	 those	
better	 could	 be	 key	 to	 mitigating	 them.	
Paying	close	attention	to	the	multiple	centers	
of	power	–	local,	regional,	and	national	–	and	
their	 interactions	 is	 the	only	way	 to	devise	
durable	 solutions	 to	 overcome	 student	
violence	in	the	country.		
Violence	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 establishing	
power	and	authority	in	student	politics,	and	
student	 activists	 are	 gradually	 trained	 to	
normalize	violence.	However,	most,	if	not	all	
student	 activists	 interviewed	 agreed	 that	
violence	is	morally	wrong,	but	also	stressed	








are	 used	 to	 fight	 the	 battles	 of	 their	 local	




While	 in	many	places	we	 studied,	 the	mid-
1990s	 to	 2008	 were	 relatively	 peaceful,	
violence	has	been	on	the	rise	since	AL	came	
to	 power	 in	 2008.	 Most	 of	 this	 violence	
involves	BCL	engaging	their	opponents	in	an	
all-out	 confrontation.	 JCD,	 for	 example,	 has	
been	 almost	 completely	 marginalized.	 The	
same	 is	 true	 for	 ICS.	At	 the	same	time,	BCL	
infighting	has	emerged	–	with	multiple	BCL	




of	 ICS.	 While	 in	 Dhaka	 BCL	 was	 able	 to	
establish	 themselves	quickly	 after	AL	 came	
“We believe that 
students who are 
now involved in 
politics, later will be 















ICS	 was	 a	 major	 player	 in	 Chittagong	
University,	 Rajshahi	 University,	 Sylhet	
University	 and	 Islamic	 University,	 and	
maintained	 an	 important	 presence	 in	 the	
colleges	 in	Khulna	 and	Bogra,	 regardless	of	
the	party	in	power	at	the	center.	Their	main	
asset	 has	 been	 their	 strict	 hierarchical	
organization,	 based	 on	 firm	 ideological	
commitment.	 It	 is	 quite	 telling	 that	 ICS	has	
hardly	seen	any	factional	fighting.	Also,	they	
have	shown	ruthlessness	 in	 their	 fight	with	
rivals	 and	 certainly	with	BCL,	 as	 evidenced	




Despite	 this	 nascent	 threat,	 BCL	 seems	 to	
have	consolidated	power	on	most	campuses	
across	 the	 country.	 Not	 only	 do	 we	 see	 an	
almost	 complete	 reduction	 of	 JCD	 and	 ICS	
violence,	but	BCL	has	taken	firm	control	over	
student	halls,	which	in	most	universities	and	




While	 many	 discontinue	 their	 political	
activities	 as	 they	 progress	 through	




Although	 they	 have	 established	 their	
dominance	now	almost	universally,	BCL	is	at	
the	 moment	 of	 writing	 going	 through	 a	
period	of	soul-searching.	Sheikh	Hasina	has	
expressed	 her	 anger	 with	 the	 BCL	 central	
committee	and	has	threatened	to	dissolve	it.	
Her	 main	 complaints	 focus	 on	 the	 lack	 of	
capacity	to	appoint	local	committees—which	
as	 we	 have	 seen	 is	 often	 tricky	 business	
involving	factional	struggles	and	violence—
and	 graft	 within	 BCL	 leadership	 who	 have	
been	 accused	 of	 taking	 bribes	 in	 the	
formation	 of	 local	 BCL	 committees.	 While	
BCL	played	an	important	role	in	the	struggle	
against	political	opponents,	and	importantly	
ICS,	 now	 that	AL	 is	 consolidating	 its	party-
state,	BCL	has	to	be	reined	in	again.	Excessive	
violence,	 as	 well	 as	 factionalism,	 is	 said	 to	





might	 be	 another	 turning	 point,	 as	 history	
shows	that	students	have	often	been	able	to	
voice	 their	 critique	 of	 the	 government,	 by	
voting	for	the	opposition	in	DUCSU	elections.	
While	BCL	managed	and	controlled	the	2019	
elections,	 the	 results	 in	 the	 less	 politically	














Wanting	 to	address	 the	 issue	of	violence	 in	
student	 politics	 is	 difficult	 without	 taking	
into	 consideration	 the	 wider	 political	
dynamics	at	play.	We	believe	 that	 trainings	
that	focus	on	democracy	and	tolerance	may	
be	 shortsighted,	 unless	 they	 take	 into	
account	 some	of	 the	 root	 causes	of	 conflict	
that	permeate	student	politics	in	Bangladesh.	
Our	fieldwork	data	show	that	most	students	
understand	 that	 violence	 or	 power	 politics	
should	 not	 be	 part	 of	 student	 politics,	 but	
they	 accepted	 it	 as	 “part	 of	 the	 game”.	 At	
times	those	involved	even	acknowledge	that	
politics	 in	 Bangladesh	 is	 “dirty”.	 Yet,	 they	
engage	in	it	anyways	to	avoid	harassment	or	
take	 advantage	of	 the	 short-	and	 long-term	
benefits	 offered	 when	 proving	 one’s	
usefulness	to	a	senior	party	leader.		
	
Another	 important	 factor,	 which	 is	 not	
specifically	 mentioned	 in	 any	 of	 the	 cases,	
but	 is	 a	 more	 general	 observation,	 is	 the	
importance	 of	 kinship	 ties.	 Students	 from		
political	 families	 tend	 to	 have	 already	
internalized	 the	 party	 ideology	 and	 have	
developed	 a	 stabilized	 political	 conviction	
instead	 of	 basing	 their	 political	 activities	
solely	 on	 inducement-based	 cost-benefit	
calculations.	 Especially	 for	 local	 students	
being	 able	 to	 draw	 on	 already	 existing	
political	 networks	 is	 advantageous	 for	
succeeding	 in	 lobby-based	 selection	
processes,	 which	 tend	 to	 favor	 these	




Also,	 in	many	 cases,	 especially	more	 senior	
student	 leaders	of	BCL,	maintain	 friendship	
relationships	 (childhood	 friends	 etc.)	 with	
JCD	 leaders,	 particularly	 in	 local	
neighborhoods.	 Instances	 where	 the	 public	
sphere	of	violent	political	contestation	exists	
parallel	 to	 private	 sphere	 inter-party	
friendships	is	more	common	than	expected.	
This	is	surprising	in	the	Bangladesh	context	
given	 the	 Manichean	 vision	 of	 student	





Adding	 to	 this,	 the	phenomenon	of	 student	
politics	 in	 Bangladesh	 cannot	 be	 viewed	 in	
isolation	 to	 the	 extensive	 politicization	 of	
university	 faculty	 and	 administrative	 staff	
along	party	lines.	While	faculty	level	politics	
is	 complex	 and	 would	 warrant	 a	 separate	
report	 altogether,	 it	 is	 still	 important	 to	
assert,	 based	 on	 the	 empiric	 evidence,	 that	
both	 faculty	 and	 members	 of	 the	
administration	 are	 often	 tied	 into	 student	





negotiations	 with	 student	 leaders	 or	 are	
faced	 with	 threats	 and	 even	 violence	














dynamics	 that	 are	 the	 underlying	 cause	 of	
violence	 in	 student	 politics,	 we	 would	 still	
like	to	suggest	four	possible	approaches	for	
mitigating	 student	 political	 violence.	 We	
however	 hope	 to	 have	 shown	 that	 student	
politics	and	violence	is	deeply	integrated	in	







also	 the	 most	 difficult	 one.	 Most	 students	
engage	 in	 power	 politics	 and	 violence	 for	
short-	or	long-term	benefits,	it	is	also	the	glue	
that	connects	student	leaders	 to	senior	city	
or	national	level	party	 leaders.	 In	 the	short	
term	it	means	a	comfortable	life	on	campus	
and	 in	 the	 long-term	 much	 better	 career	
prospects,	 especially	 when	 competing	 for	
scarce,	 but	 coveted,	 government	 jobs	 or	
business	networks.	Providing	an	alternative	
to	 these	 incentives	 or	 strengthening	 the	
career	 incentives	 for	 students	 that	 do	 not	
want	to	engage	in	“dirty”	politics,	could	help	
to	break	the	 influence	 that	student	political	
organizations	 have	 on	 student	 political	
behavior.		
While	 changing	 the	 incentive	 structure	 is	
highly	challenging	two	key	bottlenecks	might	
be	indicated,	first	at	the	start	and	the	second	
at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 student	 career.	 First,	 for	
many	students	one	of	the	main	incentives	for	
joining	 student	 politics	 in	 the	 first	 place	 is	
cheap	 accommodation	 in	 the	 student	 halls.	
As	 our	 research	 has	 shown,	 these	 student	
halls	 form	the	backbone	of	student	politics,	
and	 a	 key	 source	 of	 manpower	 and	 new	
recruitment.	Cheap	accommodation	(outside	
of	 the	 student	 halls)	 thus	 forms	 a	 key	
bottleneck,	and	certainly	for	lower	and	lower	
middle	class	students	who	really	depend	on	
the	 hall	 accommodation	 and	 find	 exit	 a	
difficult	 strategy.	 However,	 our	 data	 show	
that	 these	 additional	 student	





Second,	 white	 collar	 jobs	 remain	 limited	
outside	 of	 the	 coveted	 government	 circuit,	
for	 which	 political	 patronage	 often	 is	 key.	
Strengthening	 the	 opportunities	 for	
graduates	 is	 highly	 necessary.	 Again,	 a	
differentiated,	 and	 class-based	 focus	 might	







easily	 integrated	 in	 the	 white	 collar	 job	
market.	 For	 those	 students	 who	 covet	 a	
political	career,	it	has	to	be	stressed	that	this	
often	 means	 a	 career	 in	 local,	 and	 not	
national	politics.	More	research	is	necessary	
to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	the	making	
of	 political	 careers	 at	 the	 local	 level	 as	
anecdotal	 evidence	 at	 least	 reveals	 that	 a	
history	 in	 student	 politics	 can	 provide	 the	


























So	 far,	 though	 the	 role	 of	 female	 student	
activists	 in	 BCL	 has	 been	 largely	 symbolic	
(excluding	 those	 from	 powerful	 political	
families),	those	who	do	engage	are	often	less	
involved	 in	 violence	 and	 muscle	 politics.	







politics	 are	 generally	 considered	 “loose”	 or	
“easy”,	 and	 their	 families	 find	 it	 difficult	 to	
find	suitable	husbands	for	them.	Women	also	
have	 to	endure	rumors	suggesting	 they	are	
romantically	 involved	 with	 male	 student	
politicians.	 Given	 the	 pervasive	 structural	
barriers	 women	 face,	 building	 confidence	
and	 empowering	 female	 students	 to	 join	
politics	 (also	 in	 DUCSU	 and	 equivalent	
student	 bodies)	 might	 thus	 be	 key	 for	 the	
implementation	of	another	kind	of	politics.	A	
removal	or	at	least	a	deference	of	the	curfew	




politics.	 These	 curfews	 are	 commonly	
justified	with	a	prevalent	lack	of	security	for	
women	 to	 roam	 on	 campus	 at	 night.	 Thus,	
ensuring	safety	for	woman	on	campus	after	
sunset	 would	 support	 such	 a	 demand.	
Furthermore,	 a	 mentorship	 program	might	
be	instrumental	in	helping	women	to	find	the	
“As there is a 
tendency to exclude 
women from any 
political activities, my 
hope is that critically 
aware youths could 
change this scenario; 
As it is also important 
for youths to get 
involved in healthy 
politics (Female JCD 






confidence	 to	 overcome	 the	 reservations	
they	have	in	engaging	in	student	politics.		
	
A	 third	 approach	 is	 to	 work	 with	 student	
bodies,	such	as	DUCSU,	directly,	and	demand	
for	 the	 introduction	 of	 their	 equivalents	 in	
other	 campuses.	 Given	 the	 role	 of	 the	
judiciary	 in	 forcing	 the	 recent	 DUCSU	
elections,	this	might	provide	an	opportunity.	
Ensuring	a	free	and	fair	election	for	student	
body	 representatives	 would	 be	 an	 ideal	
intervention,	 though	 would	 likely	 prove	
difficult	 considering	 BCL	 hegemony	 and	
claim	 over	 campuses.	 However,	 also	 in	 the	
past	and	with	strong	party-political	backing	
the	 opposition	 student	 groups	 have	 been	
elected.	 Building	 awareness	 about	 this	
history	 might	 allow	 for	 gradual	 and	
incremental	 change.	 Integrating	 teaching	
staff	 in	 such	 a	 program,	 who	 as	 university	
proctors	or	hall	provosts	or	tutors	can	play	a	
role	 in	 ensuring	 the	 free	 and	 fair	nature	of	
these	 elections,	 seems	 to	 be	mandatory.	 Of	
course,	pressure	on	teaching	staff	to	comply	
with	 party-political	 pressures	 makes	 this	
exercise	also	challenging.	
	
Another	 option	 could	 be	 to	 strengthen	
political	 minorities	within	 the	 organization	
to	 ensure	 participation	 and	 to	 provide	
support	 to	 general	 students.	 Such	 efforts	
should	not	simply	focus	on	the	student	body,	
but	maybe	even	more	on	the	party-political	




of	 what	 a	 strong	 leader	 looks	 like	 in	
Bangladesh.	 Many	 BCL	 and	 JCD	 student	
leaders	 maintain	 a	 party	 ideology	 that	 is	
largely	informed	by	a	leadership	cult	paired	
with	 extreme	 nationalism	 and	 an	 image	 of	
leadership	 that	 is	 characterized	 by	
masculinity	 and	 strength.	 Citing	 political	
leaders	such	as	Adolf	Hitler	as	role	models	is	
common	 amongst	 student	 leaders.	 	 Raising	
awareness	about	nationalism	in	the	context	




Finally,	 research	 should	 try	 to	 better	
understand	 those	 places,	 like	 Khulna,	 but	
also	 possibly	 more	 rural	 college	 towns,	
where	 student	 violence	 is	 absent	 or	 less	
pronounced.	 This	 would	 allow	 to	 assess	
which	 approaches	 to	 violence	 mitigation	







cooptation	 of	 student	 groups	 by	
authoritarian	 regimes	 could	 help	 to	 better	
understand	 the	 Bangladesh	 case.	 However,	
there	 is	 a	 general	 deficit	 in	 this	 field	 of	
literature,	 which	 either	 focuses	 on	
revolutionary	 and	 reformist	 student	





gangs	 who	 try	 to	 undermine	 the	
government’s	 authority	 over	 the	monopoly	
of	 violence.	 Studies	 that	 focus	 on	 (student)	
groups	 recruited	 for	 the	 establishment,	
maintenance	 and	 perseverance	 of	
authoritarian	 regimes	 remains	 largely	
absent.	Bangladesh	as	well	as	examples	from	
regimes	in	Nicaragua	or	Russia	may	serve	as	
useful	 entry	 points	 for	 future	 research	 and	
comparison.			
	
Overall,	 the	 central	 party	 leadership	makes	
efforts	 to	discipline	 their	 student	wing,	 but	
they	are	limited	by	political	expediency.	The	
difficulty	 lies	 with	 the	 ruling	 party	 being	
dependent	on	the	mobilization	capacity	and	
the	exertion	of	control	over	students	by	their	
student	 wing	 to	 preserve	 their	 power	 and	
not	leave	a	vacuum	for	the	opposition	to	tap	
into.	Furthermore,	the	uncertainty	of	shifting	
political	 orders,	 patronage	 relations	 and	






concerns,	 sometimes	beyond	 the	 control	 of	
the	 central	 party	 leadership,	 have	 an	
important	 impact	 on	 the	 specific	 forms	 of	
student	 political	 organizations.	 While	
everyday	local	politicking	and	some	degrees	
of	 violence	 is	 condoned,	 only	 gross	
misconduct	such	as	murder	or	rape	usually	
leads	 to	 more	 severe	 legal	 and	 political	
consequences.	 This	 happened,	 for	 example,	
recently,	after	the	brutal	killing	of	a	general	
student	 in	 a	 student	 hall	 at	 Bangladesh	
University	 of	 Engineering	 and	 Technology	
(BUET)	in	Dhaka	by	BCL	cadres.	Following	a	
public	 outcry	 for	 justice	 the	 perpetrators	
were	expelled	from	the	party	and	arrested	by	
the	 police	 and	 are	 now	 under	 trial.	
Furthermore,	 protests	 and	 public	 pressure	





partly	 comply	 with	 the	 demands	 of	 the	
protestors,	 however,	 is	 a	 positive	 signal,	
which	 gives	 hope	 that	 public	 pressure	 will	
slowly	 lead	 to	a	general	reevaluation	of	 the	
ruling	party’s	strategy	to	student	politics	and	











































	 	 	 	
	
	
	
	 	
	
